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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are becoming ubiquitous providing low-cost,
low-power, and low-complexity systems where control and communication are tightly
integrated. Although much security research into WSNs has been accomplished,
researchers struggle to conduct a thorough analysis of closed-source proprietary pro-
tocols. Of the numerous available and under-analyzed proprietary protocols, those
based on ITU-T G.9959 recommendation specifying narrow-band sub-GHz communi-
cations have significant growth potential. The Z-Wave protocol is the most common
implementation of this recommendation. Z-Wave developers are required to sign
nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements, limiting the availability of tools to per-
form open source research.
As the Department of Defense begins its integration of WSNs into their secure in-
frastructure, it is crucial to fully understand the security implications involved while
using available systems and protocols. In this way, accurate risk and vulnerability
assessments can be accomplished with information gathered during protocol security
evaluations. Furthermore, with knowledge gained, security researchers can develop
tools and methods to reduce the attack surface thereby allowing for safer WSN inte-
gration into their network infrastructure.
Motivated by the need for security evaluations, this work discovers new vulnera-
bilities in the Z-Wave protocol and supported devices. These vulnerabilities allow an
attacker to inject rogue devices into the network and perform a type of covert chan-
nel attack by hiding information in Z-Wave packets. Given existing vulnerabilities
and exploitations, defensive countermeasures are needed. This work thus engineers
a Misuse-Based Intrusion Detection System (MBIDS) capable of monitoring Z-Wave
iv
networks and designs three experiments to test the detection accuracy of the system
against attacks. Results from the experiments demonstrate the MBIDS can accu-
rately detect intrusions in a Z-Wave network achieving a mean misuse detection rate
of 99%.
Overall, this research contributes new vulnerabilities and exploitations in Z-Wave
networks and an MBIDS capable of detecting rogue devices and manipulated packet
injection attacks, enabling more secure Z-Wave networks.
v
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A MISUSE-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
FOR ITU-T G.9959 WIRELESS NETWORKS
I. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are technologies where computing, communica-
tions, and control are tightly coupled [FR15a]. WSNs consist of multiple sensor nodes
that collect information, respond to commands, and report updates to other nodes
in the network [HGSW11] and are used in military surveillance, health care, environ-
mental science, smart metering, and home automation [SWH11, RM12, RM13]. The
use of WSNs is increasing because they extend communications ranges at low-cost,
low-power, and low-complexity [PTBR14].
A security analysis of WSNs is accomplished discussing the security implications
of various protocols when used in critical infrastructure analyzing attack classes in-
cluding reconnaissance, packet injection, denial-of-service, and man-in-the-middle
[RM12]. Reaves and Morris [RM12] analyze IEEE 802.11-based protocols, IEEE
802.15.4-based protocols, and proprietary protocols. However, since proprietary pro-
tocols are closed-source, there are few security research publications regarding their
use. Therefore, researchers have struggled to conduct a thorough analysis.
Of the numerous wireless protocols, those based on the International Telecom-
munications Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) G.9959 rec-
ommendation have significant growth potential in WSNs. The ITU-T G.9959 speci-
fies short range narrow-band sub-GHz communications [ITU15]. The most common
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implementation of the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation is commercially known as Z-
Wave, marketed by Sigma Designs. However, security evaluations of the Z-Wave
protocol are difficult because developers are required to sign Nondisclosure Agree-
ments (NDAs), limiting the availability of tools to perform open source research.
New and emerging network protocols are often initially believed secure, but are not
vetted until tools exist for security research [GBM+12].
Furthermore, the increase in the use of WSNs furthers their integration and ap-
plication in many industries and organizations, including the Department of Defense
(DoD). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to develop and test the
effectiveness of WSNs for law enforcement and first responder applications [DHS10].
Smart metering initiatives are also currently directed for all military bases. While
ITU-T G.9959-based wireless systems, including Z-Wave, are currently not preva-
lent in DoD infrastructures, their growth potential motivates the need for in-depth
security evaluations of its use before its integration. When integration occurs, the vul-
nerability analysis and exploitation presented herein allows DoD system integration
engineers the ability to conduct valid Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs) and
develop tools and methods to reduce the attack surface before full system integration.
Recent works discuss the evaluation of the Z-Wave protocol including vulnerability
analysis and exploitation. These works are categorized as either a gateway approach
or a Radio Frequency (RF) approach.
The gateway approach mainly investigates the security implications of using Z-
Wave gateway controllers from varying vendors. Many gateway controllers are not
engineered with security in mind. Researchers have therefore discovered and analyzed
vulnerabilities exploiting them gaining full control of the device. As the gateway into
the Z-Wave network, access to the gateway controller allows for full control of Z-Wave
devices.
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The RF approach focuses on packet capture and replay or injection. Z-Wave RF
traffic is captured using open source hardware and software tools. Captured packets
are dissected for evaluation whereby the attacker can now craft their own packets and
inject them into the network maliciously modifying network operations.
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Goals
1.2.1 Problem Statement.
Vulnerabilities in the Z-Wave protocol and network implementations have been
discovered and are discussed in Section 2.5. However, any means of proposing detec-
tion or prevention of attacks in Z-Wave networks is lacking. Although the discovery
of vulnerabilities and exploitations are necessary to conduct RVAs, proper security
countermeasures are needed in order to safely employ Z-Wave networks.
1.2.2 Research Goals.
It is hypothesized that by conducting deep Z-Wave packet inspection, known good
packets and malicious packets are distinguishable. Furthermore, their differences can
be used to create a monitoring tool for Z-Wave networks.
This thesis focuses on designing and engineering a Misuse-Based Intrusion Detec-
tion System (MBIDS) that allows an investigator or system administrator to monitor
Z-Wave traffic in real-time for any transmissions intended to disrupt normal network
operations. The MBIDS is designed to operate on the Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) that the Z-Wave gateway controller resides on. As packets are transmitted
within the Z-Wave network, the MBIDS captures and evaluates them for validity. If
the packet is not valid, is from a rogue device, or is manipulated, the MBIDS logs
the packet as a misuse case and notifies the investigator or system administrator of
malicious activity.
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There are four primary goals for this research.
• Discover misuse cases by capturing, dissecting, and evaluating Z-Wave packets.
• Identify the misuse detection rate of the MBIDS against rogue device attacks.
• Evaluate the effectiveness of the MBIDS against manipulated injected packet
attacks.
• Implement enhancement strategies and evaluated the hypothesized increase mis-
use detection rate.
1.3 Approach
A Python-based monitoring tool is developed that receives captured packets from
a Z-Wave-capable Software Defined Radio (SDR). The tool uses signatures and states
that are derived from an in depth study of Z-Wave packet transmissions. This study
compares the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation with the packet byte fields in order to
establish a framework for further evaluation. This framework allows for the develop-
ment of signatures and protocol states for packet comparison. A real-world Z-Wave
network is then engineered with a gateway controller and multiple devices on a WLAN
backbone to test the effectiveness of the MBIDS against two new attacks presented
herein evaluating the efficacy of this approach.
1.4 Assumptions and Limitations
This research provides a proof of concept system for detecting rogue devices and
maliciously injected packets in Z-Wave networks. The Z-Wave network is controlled
by a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B with General Purpose Input/Output RaZberry Pi
Daughter Card version 2.0.0 (henceforth referred to as RaZberry Pi). Although the ex-
ploitations presented herein and the system developed are applicable to other Z-Wave
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gateways, scripts are written specifically to work in conjunction with the RaZberry
Pi because of its low-cost and available documentation [RaZ15], allowing for a clear
understanding of its software framework.
1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter II presents relevant technical details of the Z-Wave protocol, an overview
of Home Automation Networks (HANs), and background information of Intrusion
Detection System (IDS). Also presented are related works in the area of Z-Wave re-
search, including vulnerability analysis and exploitation of the protocol and gateway
controllers. Chapter III motivates the need for countermeasures against two new
Z-Wave attacks and others within their taxonomy, namely rogue device attacks and
manipulated packet injection attacks. Chapter IV outlines the methodology used to
design, set up, and conduct the experiments to test the effectiveness of the MBIDS.
Chapter V provides a discussion and analysis of the experiment results. The conclu-
sions drawn from the experiment results, the significance of the MBIDS, and areas
for future research are given in Chapter VI.
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II. Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents Z-Wave background information and related research in-
cluding protocol specifics and a discussion of vulnerabilities and exploitations of Z-
Wave networks. Section 2.2 provides relevant technical details of the Z-Wave protocol
and Section 2.3 discusses various attack classes in Z-Wave networks. An overview of
HANs is provided in Section 2.4 providing a clearer understanding of the design of
experiments in Section 4.8. Section 2.5 discusses vulnerabilities and exploitations in
Z-Wave networks. Section 2.6 discusses basics of an IDS providing necessary infor-
mation supporting the choice of an MBIDS over other types of IDSs. This chapter
then concludes and is summarized in Section 2.7.
2.2 The Z-Wave Protocol
All Z-Wave products adhere to the ITU-T G.9959 Physical (PHY), Media Access
Control (MAC), Segmentation and Reassembly (SAR), and Logical Link Control
(LLC) layer specification. This ensures interoperability between vendor devices, but
differ at the Application Layer (Figure 1). ITU-T G.9959-based networks operate
in the industrial, scientific, and medical bands: 908.4 MHz in North America and
additional frequencies in other regions. Control nodes send commands and slave
nodes respond to commands in Z-Wave networks. As a meshed topology network,
slave nodes also forward commands to other nodes not directly reachable by the
control node. Message forwarding has a hop limit of four nodes and a maximum of
232 nodes are allowed. For network overlap, each Z-Wave network has a unique 4B
Home Identification (ID) specified by the controller. The Z-Wave protocol consists of
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Figure 1. Z-Wave protocol reference model
five layers where the Adaptive Layer is a set of three layers: SAR, Network (NWK),
and Encryption (ENC) as illustrated in Figure 1.
2.2.1 PHY Layer.
The PHY layer uses carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance to mod-
erate access to the wireless medium. The protocol supports three data rates: 9.6 kbps
(R1), 40 kbps (R2), and 100 kbps (R3). Figure 2 illustrates the PHY Protocol Data
Unit consisting of the PHY Header, PHY Service Data Unit (PSDU) and the End
of Frame delimiter (EoF) . The maximum PSDU size is 170B while operating at R3.
However, if the transceiver is operating at R1 or R2, the maximum PSDU size is 64B.
2.2.2 MAC Layer.
The MAC layer is responsible for the transfer of data between nodes in the net-
work. It is also responsible for frame acknowledgment, data validation, and retrans-
mission. The three types of MAC frames are singlecast, multicast, and acknowledg-
ment. The MAC frame structure is shown in Figure 2. When a node transmits a
7
Figure 2. Z-Wave frame structure for APP, LLC, MAC, and PHY layers.
singlecast frame, there is one destination address. Upon receipt of a singlecast frame,
a device responds with an acknowledgment frame. Acknowledgment frames and sin-
glecast frames are structured similarly with the exception of a zero-byte MAC Service
Data Unit (MSDU) in the acknowledgment frame. Conversely, multicast frames are
sent to multiple destination nodes without acknowledgments.
2.2.3 Adaptive Layer.
The Adaptive Layer uses the sublayers to handle mesh network routing at the
NWK layer, segmentation and reassembly of datagrams at the SAR layer, and en-
cryption at the ENC layer. The sublayer is selected based on values set in the Frame
Control field of the MAC Header or the Command Class field of the LLC Layer (Fig-
ure 2). If specific values in the Frame Control field are not set, the packet is forwarded
to the following layer without action. The remaining specifics of the Adaptive Layers
are out of scope of this research and are not discussed any further.
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Of note, the Z-Wave protocol supports the Advanced Encryption Standard with
128-bit keys. Although supported, encryption is not required. In the low-rate, low-
power WSNs, memory and power are limited, discouraging vendors from adding
features unless necessary [Bee08]. Surveys of similar protocols conclude the use of
encryption is not universal [RMSB13].
2.2.4 LLC Layer and Application Layer.
The LLC layer consists of the Command Class, Command, and Application Layer
Payload (Application Parameters) (Figure 2). Command Classes are broken into two
classes: the device class and Command Class.
A Command Class is related to a certain function or device. An example is the
Binary Switch Command Class. The Binary Switch uses three Commands: SET to
turn a device on or off, GET to request a device status, and REPORT to respond to the
request. These three Commands are foundational to all Z-Wave devices.
The device class is subdivided into the basic, generic and special device classes.
The basic device class distinguishes between controller, slave or routing-slave device
types. The generic device class defines what function the device performs as a con-
troller or slave. Lastly, the special device class allows for more specificity in the device
functionality.
The Application Layer consists of the Application Parameters and is implemen-
tation specific depending on the Z-Wave developer. The parameters are used by the
device in execution of the Command to perform a specific function.
2.3 Z-Wave Attack Classes
While Z-Wave is a proprietary protocol stack, vendors are able to purchase a Soft-
ware Development Kit (SDK) to produce Z-Wave certified products. Given the nature
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of hardware and software development, there are some vulnerabilities introduced by
developer-specific implementation faults, as illustrated in [FG13]. This section fo-
cuses on potential vulnerabilities of the underlying ITU-T G.9959 recommendation
common to all devices and the attack classes that exploit those vulnerabilities. The
three classes of Z-Wave attacks discussed in this section are: reconnaissance, denial of
service, and packet injection. These three attacks undermine network confidentiality,
availability, and integrity, respectively. Reconnaissance attacks involve an attacker
passively collecting traffic or actively probing a target network to gain information
without interfering with normal network operations. Denial of service attacks prevent
wireless system access and cause varying degrees of system unavailability. Packet in-
jection attacks involve the transmission of specially-crafted packets with the intent of
manipulating network or device behavior.
2.3.1 Reconnaissance.
A reconnaissance attack occurs when an attacker gains information about a net-
work. The information received can include protocols in use, device types, traffic flow
patterns, and even encryption keys if not handled properly. Information received from
reconnaissance may prove useful in providing the attacker with an accurate mapping
of the system, services, or vulnerabilities enabling more significant attacks in the
future. Using a high-gain antenna, observations can be achieved at long distances,
allowing the attacker to remain inconspicuous while gathering information.
Z-Wave network information gathered useful to the attacker are: (i) the use of
encryption during transmission and (ii) the frame header content which includes the
unique Home ID of the Z-Wave network, Source ID of the device being sniffed and
Destination ID. Reconnaissance lays the foundation for more sophisticated follow-on
attacks.
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Demonstrations of Z-Wave exploitation have been published to date all of which
rely heavily on the ability to conduct reconnaissance to gain requisite knowledge for
crafting follow-on attacks; they are discussed in further detail in Section 2.5.
2.3.2 Denial of Service.
Denial of service attacks prevent access to contentious resources, such as the RF
spectrum, with the effect of degrading legitimate system access. Studies have demon-
strated such attacks are easily accomplished using off-the-shelf equipment [PIK11].
Denial of service attacks on wireless networks can deny or degrade access to resources
from the PHY to Application layer. For example, the PHY layer may be susceptible
to narrow-band jamming, the carrier sense algorithms may be exploited to deny ac-
cess to the medium [XTZW05], or routing nodes can be consumed with overflowing
interface queues.
Constant and deceptive jamming are effective for conducting denial of service
attacks due to MAC layer collision avoidance characteristics of Z-Wave. While an
attacker is operating a constant or deceptive jammer, any node within range will
sense the channel as busy and wait to transmit. Even more effective and efficient
is reactive jamming [LKP10] because it is difficult to detect [SDv10]. A reactive
jammer only transmitting after a preamble and start of frame delimeter of a Z-Wave
PHY frame is detected need only corrupt one bit of the PSDU in order to cause an
integrity check error and complete loss of the frame. The non-correcting integrity
checks used for Z-Wave are capable of detecting, but not correcting, single bit errors.
Even worse, the corruption of a single bit in the Z-Wave PHY layer, unlike PHY layers
that use spreading techniques such as direct sequence spread spectrum, is achievable
using narrow-band jamming. Use of error correction codes, as in IEEE 802.11a, is
more robust to bitwise jamming [Nou12]. Table 1 presents a preliminary estimate of
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Table 1. Jamming efficiency against Z-Wave frames [BFH+15].
Integrity Jammer
Data Rate Check* Max Payload Bits to Jam Efficiency
9.6 kbps (R1) 8-bit checksum 512 bits 1 512
40 kbps (R2) 8-bit checksum 512 bits 1 512
100 kbps (R3) 16-bit checksum 1360 bits 1 1360
*Z-Wave uses non-correcting integrity checks.
jammer efficiency in bits jammed per bit transmitted against Z-Wave (i.e., ratio of
communication effort to jammer effort), based on results in [Nou12].
Depending on the objective, an attacker may use any of the methods described
to deny the availability of one or more nodes in the wireless network. For example,
a Z-Wave network containing a thermostat (sensor) and water valve (actuator) could
be subject to a denial of service attack that prevents the thermostat from reporting
the current temperature or obstructs commands . A similar scenario was success-
fully demonstrated in [RM12], with a gas pipeline Remote Terminal Unit including a
wireless pressure sensor, pump, and relief valve.
Denial of service attacks against Z-Wave networks may also result from flooding
the network with spoofed packets. This method is discussed further in the following
section.
2.3.3 Packet Injection.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless networks, an attacker armed with informa-
tion gained from reconnaissance may be able to inject forged packets into the network.
The ability to conduct packet injection enables an attacker to masquerade as a le-
gitimate network device while transmitting messages to manipulate overall system
operation. Using publicly available hardware and software, researchers have recently
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reported the ability to conduct packet injection attacks to manipulate Z-Wave de-
vices. An attacker may be able to (i) flood the network with traffic causing a denial
of service at the routing or Application layers, (ii) send false status messages, and
(iii) provide the control node with false routing information to poison the network
routing table. If the target Z-Wave network has been implemented in a HAN security
system, the ability to inject commands and report false state information prove dis-
astrous. For example, an attacker chooses to send an OFF command to an alarm in
a security system immediately following every ON command sent by the door sensor.
As a result, those occupying the residence are unaware the alarm should be activated.
2.4 Home Automation Networks
A HAN consists of wireless sensors that exchange control and information mes-
sages [LK12]. Device types include door locks, security sensors, alarms, environmen-
tal controls, light modules, and motion sensors (Figure 3). The user either manages
the HAN with a Z-Wave controller from inside the home (local access) or a hybrid
controller providing local and global access (Figure 4).
Managing the Z-Wave HAN locally lessens the features and span of network con-
trol. Being able to only manage the network from within the home does not provide
the user with the ability to control devices while beyond the controller RF transmis-
sion range. However, managing the network through a globally connected gateway
provides the user with the ability to control their network with a mobile device or
other Internet connected computer from any geographic location. For example, if a
user forgets to lock their door or arm the alarm system when they leave the house,
they can login to the gateway and configure devices. With this accessibility comes
added vulnerabilities. Not only does the user have access to their Z-Wave HAN, but
anyone that can compromise their WLAN defense can also garner access [FR15b].
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Figure 3. Home automation network model: multiple Z-Wave devices communicating
with each other and controlled by the Z-Wave gateway [FR15a].
As reported in [Smi14], 65% of households with Internet access have a WLAN.
Statistics show that between 11% to 30% of households have unsecured WLANs
[Wig15]. A survey of IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Personal Area Networks in ten US cities
found similar percentages of unsecured networks [RMSB13]. Even if the WLANs
are secured, there are weaknesses and proven exploits against all WLAN security
protocols [Lan05, FNS12, Ahm10].
WLAN access is not the only means to gain access to a gateway device. An
attacker can gain physical access to the gateway by intercepting it en route to the
retailer or end user [BW15] or social engineering attacks, prompting an attacker to
install malware on their device [GSC+14].
Although physical access and social engineering attacks are both viable means to
gain access to a gateway, they both provide the target with more opportunities to
discover the attack. WLAN compromise allows an attacker to remain hidden while
performing attacks solely through the RF spectrum.
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Figure 4. (a) Local gateway access: users manage their Z-Wave HAN via their gateway
locally. All device control is performed from inside the home. (b) Global gateway
access: users manage their Z-Wave HAN via their gateway locally or globally. Z-Wave
devices can be controlled using any Internet connected device [FR15a].
2.5 Vulnerability Analysis and Exploitation in Z-Wave Networks
Previous works show the possibility of exploiting vulnerabilities in Z-Wave net-
works. These works are categorized as a RF approach or gateway approach exploiting
PHY layer transmissions and device vulnerabilities, respectively. The former includes
packet capture and injection attacks whereas the latter includes exploitation of Z-
Wave gateways.
2.5.1 Packet Capture and Injection in Z-Wave Networks.
Packet injection attacks enable an attacker to masquerade as a legitimate user.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless networks, an attacker armed with tools ca-
pable of capturing wireless information can inject forged packets into the network.
Since Z-Wave developers are required to sign NDAs, researchers use publicly available
tools to conduct packet capture and injection attacks in Z-Wave networks.
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2.5.1.1 Z-Force.
Fouladi and Ghanoun [FG13] provide the first public vulnerability research of the
Z-Wave protocol. They develop a sniffer project known as Z-Force. The sniffer project
consists of two Texas Instruments CC1110 boards (one transmits and one receives),
custom firmware, and a Windows-based User Interface (UI). Before implementing the
sniffer, Fouladi and Ghanoun conduct an in-depth study of the Z-Wave protocol and
uncover the details of frame encryption and authentication algorithms. They discover
an implementation error used in a Z-Wave compliant door lock that allows them to
reset the established network key.
The Z-Force tool allows them to capture the Home ID of the controller and Node
ID of the device, reset the network key to a different value, and inject unauthorized
commands into the Z-Wave HAN. As a result, they are able to open and close the lock
by bypassing the controller. The Z-Force tool has only been demonstrated to work on
the 860.4 MHz European frequency and its closed-source nature inhibits successful
implementation and replication.
2.5.1.2 Scapy-Radio.
Another analysis of Z-Wave is the Scapy-Radio project [PLD14]. Scapy-Radio
combines Scapy and gnuRadio software on the Ettus Universal Software Radio Pe-
ripheral (USRP) B210 to capture traffic and replay packets back into the Z-Wave
HAN. To test their device, Picod et al. [PLD14] implement a Z-Wave HAN using a
Raspberry Pi and an Aeon Labs Z-Stick programmed using the open source Open-
ZWave software. They include two Z-Wave devices into the network: an alarm device
and a motion sensor. Capturing the network traffic, Picod et al. [PLD14] record and
analyze packets, noticing that when the motion sensor is activated, it sends a packet
to the controller.
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Upon receipt, the controller sends a packet to the alarm device with a command
to activate. After multiple improvements, Scapy-Radio is now able to detect ON
commands from the controller to the alarm device and subsequently inject OFF com-
mands to the alarm effectively denying service to the device.
2.5.1.3 AFIT Sniffer.
The AFIT Sniffer [BFH+15] is an extension of Scapy-Radio [PLD14]. Badenhop
et al. [BFH+15] develop a Z-Wave packet sniffer using a USRP N210, gnuRadio,
Scapy-Radio, and a Z-Wave Wireshark dissector. Using this tool, they passively dis-
criminate between Z-Wave devices by functionality and vendor. To do this, Badenhop
et al. observe acknowledgment response times to identify implementation differences
in device firmware. Their results show that using this technique, devices are distin-
guishable if their manufacturers are different suggesting intra-vendor similarities. The
AFIT Sniffer is used in the research herein and is further discussed in Section 4.7.
2.5.1.4 EZ-Wave.
The authors of [HRRL16] extend work by [PLD14] providing broad support for
the Z-Wave protocol. Specifically, Hall et al. [HRRL16] demonstrate transceiver
fingerprinting through preamble manipulation using two low-cost HackRF SDRs. The
result is an open source tool EZ-Wave: a set of Z-Wave network reconnaissance
tools capable of network discovery and enumeration, device fingerprinting, and device
status information gathering. The ability to accurately fingerprint Z-Wave devices
using EZ-Wave allows an attacker to discover door locks that have the encryption
flaw discovered in [FG13] and exploit them.
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2.5.2 Gateway Attacks in Z-Wave Networks.
There are two types of control nodes in Z-Wave networks. Portable controllers are
handheld devices that allow a user to control devices from within RF transmission
range. As discussed in Section 2.4, gateway controllers provide the user the ability to
manage their Z-Wave network locally or globally..
Given the global accessibility of the gateway and the chain of trust between the
gateway and the WLAN backbone, if an attacker gains access to the WLAN, the
attacker has access to the gateway. After gaining access, the inherent vulnerabilities
in Z-Wave gateways allow an attacker to easily take control of the network [FR15b].
Vulnerabilities include:
• Lack of user validation (e.g., insecure web UI)
• Lack of gateway encryption (e.g., messages are sent unencrypted)
• Enabled and unused services (e.g., port 22 - Secure Shell (SSH))
The resulting implications of the inherent vulnerabilities are seen in the following
works.
2.5.2.1 Insufficient Authentication Checks.
The authors of [CBS13] demonstrate the exploitation of several HAN gateways,
including the VeraLite Smart Home Controller. Crowley et al. [CBS13] find several
vulnerabilities that expose sensitive information from the VeraLite while allowing an
attacker to fully control devices on the network. Finding insufficient authentication
checks and lack of user validation, a universal plug and play functionality is exposed
allowing an attacker to execute Lua code, a programming language designed for em-
bedded clients, as root user. Crowley et al. [CBS13] exploit this vulnerability and
successfully create a backdoor account on the device.
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Another vulnerability found is that the VeraLite does not protect against Cross-
Site Request Forgery. It is therefore possible for an attacker to update the device
firmware with their own malicious firmware. It has been shown that remote modi-
fication of firmware can severely affect a device and expose confidential information
[CV11].
2.5.2.2 Non-network Device Exploitation.
Oluwafemi et al. [OGPK13] investigate the feasibility of causing physical harm
to HAN users through the explosion of Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs). Four
distinct electronic signals are transmitted to CFLs connected to a Z-Wave device until
the CFLs emit a visual or auditory spark or fail completely. Although they conclude
that harming individuals via their attack vector is difficult, they observe that non-
networked devices, such as CFLs, might possibly be connected to networked devices
and therefore can be compromised remotely given HAN insecurities.
2.5.2.3 Address Resolution Protocol Poisoning towards Gateway
Exploitation.
Recently, Barcena and Wueest [BW15] discuss multiple insecurities in HANs. Dur-
ing their research, Barcena and Wueest [BW15] poison the gateway Address Resolu-
tion Protocol to redirect firmware update requests to their own malicious server. After
modifying the firmware, the gateway receives the malicious firmware as a legitimate
update giving the attacker full control. Barcena and Wueest [BW15] also directly
access the controller application since the device does not require user authentication
and has an insecure web UI.
These early studies illustrate the possible attacks resulting from wireless traffic
capture and injection or compromise of the Z-Wave gateway. All Z-Wave related
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research to date discover and exploit vulnerabilities in the protocol or devices. The
obvious area of research that is lacking are proposals or methodologies to secure Z-
Wave networks. Therefore, previous works, including newly discovered vulnerabilities,
motivate the need for countermeasures toward safe Z-Wave employment.
2.6 Intrusion Detection Systems
An IDS monitors events occurring on a network or computer device analyzing
them for possible malicious or unwanted activities [NIS07] that attempt to compro-
mise resource confidentiality, integrity, and availability [Yus08]. Additionally, IDSs
are used to identify problems with security policies, deterring individuals from circum-
venting security policies, and logging incidents for further review by the administrator
or investigator. There are three main types of IDS deployments: Network, Wireless,
and Host.
2.6.1 Network IDS.
A Network IDS (NIDS) analyzes all network traffic (Figure 5). Working in promis-
cuous mode, the NIDS captures network traffic and evaluates it checking for unusual
activity that violates predetermined specifications. Once malicious activity is de-
tected, the investigator or system administrator are notified or the violation is logged
for future auditing and review. A NIDS is solely a passive system, only capturing,
identifying, alerting, and/or logging any security incidents on the network.
2.6.2 Wireless IDS.
A Wireless IDS (WIDS) monitors the RF spectrum, capturing packets and ana-
lyzing them for any unwanted or malicious activity (Figure 6). Similar to the NIDS,
the WIDS serves to detect violations and report or log incidents for an administrator
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Figure 5. Logical topology of a NIDS
or investigator to review and act upon. Given that wireless networks are particularly
vulnerable to spoofing and route poisoning attacks due to the congested transmission
medium, previous research proposes wireless intrusion detection through preamble
manipulation in IEEE 802.15.4 networks [RMTG15].
2.6.3 Host IDS.
The Host IDS (HIDS) identifies threats to a specific device. The HIDS can operate
by taking a snapshot of a system and comparing it to a previous snapshot in order
to identify if any critical system fields are modified or deleted [NIS07]. If so, an
alert is sent to the administrator or investigator for review or is logged for future
auditing. However, the HIDS can also be an agent installed on the individual system
to monitor for any suspicious or malicious activity (Figure 7). As in all other IDS
deployments, the HIDS is passive, only capturing, identifying, alerting, and/or logging
any security incidents on the device. Examples of HIDS agents are NortonTMAntivirus
and McAfee R© Antivirus software.
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Figure 6. Logical topology of a WIDS
Whether the IDS is employed as a Network, Wireless, or Host, there are varying
detection mechanisms that are used. Type of detection mechanisms include Signature-
Based Detection, Anomaly-Based Detection, Stateful Protocol Analysis, and Misuse-
Based Detection [NIS07]. The proceeding sections discuss each detection mechanisms
including pros and cons for each.
Figure 7. Logical topology of a HIDS
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2.6.4 Signature-Based Detection.
Signature-Based detection mechanisms work by identifying signatures that corre-
spond to known threats [NIS07]. Examples of signatures are:
• Any e-mail attachments with extension .exe, which can be a malicious exe-
cutable
• Any wireless packet that contains a source ID that does not actually exist on
the network
2.6.4.1 Advantages.
Signature-Based IDSs are dependent upon a set of signatures that must be estab-
lished before the IDS is operational. Signature-Based IDSs are lightweight and if the
database of signatures are thorough, the likelihood of improperly classifying a packet
is low. This means that correct classification is high for malicious traffic.
2.6.4.2 Disadvantages.
Signature-Based IDSs cannot detect zero day attacks or new exploits, resulting
in a relatively high false rejection rates. Packet analysis also provides a possible
bottleneck to network traffic. In order to detect a packet matching the database of
signatures, the IDS conducts exact string matching or approximate string matching.
This can be time consuming depending on the quantity of signatures to evaluate
captured packets against.
2.6.5 Anomaly-Based Detection.
Anomaly-Based detection compares definitions of normal activity with observed
events to identify deviations [NIS07]. To determine normal activity, profiles are con-
structed that represent normal usage based on present system operation. The profiles
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are then used to train the system with regard to legitimate behaviors. However, when
a system is being trained, it is most vulnerable to experienced intruders aimed at
training the system to point to intrusive behaviors that will seem normal.
2.6.5.1 Advantages.
The advantages of using Anomaly-Based detection is, unlike Signature-Based de-
tection, there is a relatively high probability of detecting new types of attacks because
they create instances that are out of sync with normal system operation. They are
also able to detect the abuse of user privileges which are undetectable by a Signature-
Based IDS.
2.6.5.2 Disadvantages.
Disadvantages of Anomaly-Based IDSs include their tendency to generate high
improper classifications, specifically, classifying a malicious packet as normal. Because
system usage is not generally monitored during the profile creation and training phase,
normal user activity is not recorded. Therefore, false alarms are reported even though
the behavior should be classified as normal.
2.6.6 Stateful Protocol Analysis.
Stateful protocol analysis works by comparing observed events with previously
established profiles of generally accepted definitions of benign protocol activity for
each protocol state [Kru04, NIS07]. Stateful means the IDS can understand and
track the state of the protocols that have a notion of state. An example of stateful
protocol analysis detection is monitoring a requests with its subsequent response. In
this case, every request should have a certain response. Any response that does not
conform to what is expected is classified as a violation.
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2.6.6.1 Advantages.
The advantages of stateful protocol analysis is the ability to identify non-standard
sequences of commands (e.g., issuing the same command over and over). Stateful
protocol analysis is especially advantageous as an authenticator for suspicious activity
given that the protocol requires authentication.
2.6.6.2 Disadvantages.
Disadvantages of stateful protocol analysis include high overhead because a state
has to be recorded for later comparison. Stateful protocol analysis also cannot detect
any attacks that do not violate generally accepted characteristics of protocol behavior.
For proprietary protocols, details about the protocols are generally not available,
making it difficult for to perform comprehensive, accurate analysis [NIS07].
2.6.7 Misuse-Based Detection.
There are varying definitions of Misuse-Based detection. Herein, Misuse-Based
detection is defined as a process of comparing predetermined definitions or protocol
states with observed transmissions. Any violation of the known-good status is clas-
sified as a misuse case. Signature-based detection is sometimes referred to as misuse
detection [NIS07]. However, if they are synonymous, the resulting implications are
misuse is only detected using signatures, which is not true. Misuse is detected using
signatures and other methods like stateful protocol analysis. For this purpose of this
work, an MBIDS includes signature-based detection and stateful protocol analysis.
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2.7 Summary
This chapter presents relevant technical details of the Z-Wave protocol, HANs, and
IDSs. Also presented are related research in vulnerability analysis and exploitation
of Z-Wave networks.
An MBIDS is chosen over an Anomaly-Based IDS, solely Signature-Based IDS, and
solely Stateful protocol analysis. Anomaly-Based systems tend to generate high im-
proper classifications [NIS07]. Furthermore, the system is most vulnerable to packet
injection attacks during the training phase recording malicious activity as normal.
Although Signature-Based IDSs and Stateful protocol analysis can detect intrusions
in Z-Wave networks, the combination of both (an MBIDS) provides the greatest pos-
sibility of monitoring Z-Wave networks. Based on the information provided herein,
a wireless Misuse-Based detection mechanism is most suitable to identify attacks in
Z-Wave networks.
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III. Persistent Backdoor Attacks in Z-Wave Gateways
3.1 Introduction
Section 2.5 provides a discussion of previous works related to vulnerability anal-
ysis and exploitation in Z-Wave networks. These are categorized as gateway or RF
approaches. This chapter presents two novel Z-Wave gateway attacks that create a
persistent attack channel to the Z-Wave network with the second considered a hy-
brid (gateway/RF) approach. The first attack, discussed in Section 3.2, exploits
Z-Wave gateway vulnerabilities that allow rogue device injection, specifically con-
trollers. Section 3.3 presents a covert channel initiated Reverse SSH attack creating
a open connection from the Z-Wave gateway to any Internet connected device the
attacker chooses.
3.2 Rogue Controller Injection
There are three phases to this attack. First, is the initial reconnaissance of each
device, where the default settings and modes of operations are identified. The second
phase examines vulnerabilities in the device implementation that enables attackers to
take control of the Z-Wave HAN. Phase three exploits a new vulnerability that allows
an attacker to create a persistent attack channel by injecting a rogue controller into
the Z-Wave HAN.
The equipment used to conduct vulnerability scanning and exploitation include
those listed in Table 2, an Alfa AWUS036H Card, and an Aspire RF Wireless con-
troller (Figure 8). Software tools used include aircrack-ng to defeat WLAN defense,
Zenmap to scan the WLAN for Z-Wave gateways, Burp Proxy to capture and inject
packets, and Putty to gain backend access via SSH.
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Table 2. Hardware and software components
Classification Type Nomenclature
Hardware
Computer HP EliteBook 8570w
Processor Intel Core i7-3720QM CPU
RAM 16.0 GB
System Type 64-bit
Software
Operating System Ubuntu 14.04
Software Development LiClipse 2.2.0.2
Figure 8. Equipment used for vulnerability scanning and exploitation: (a) HP Elitebook
8570w, (b) Alfa AWUS036H Card, and (c) Aspire RF Wireless controller [FR15a].
3.2.1 Reconnaissance.
The three Z-Wave gateways under test are the VeraEdge Home Controller, RaZberry
Pi, and the Almond+ (Figure 9). A real-world Z-Wave HAN is engineered using each
gateway, each consisting of a smart switch, a light module, a door lock, and a water
valve (Figure 10) that are dispersed throughout the network. It is apparent that
each gateway device is configured with varying default settings (Table 3). Gate-
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Figure 9. Gateways devices: (a) Gateway 1 - VeraEdge, (b) Gateway 2 - RaZberry Pi,
and (c) Gateway 3 - Almond+ [FR15a].
ways 1 and 2 use a web UI, the only way to interact with either device. On the other
hand, Gateway 3 has a touch screen that allows the user to configure all the settings
without a web UI. However, in order for a user to access any HAN globally, a web UI
is needed.
The Gateway 3 UI is enabled for this experiment to replicate how an actual
Almond+ HAN with Internet accessibility would function. The UIs allow access to
the gateways locally by navigating to the IP address of the device or globally through
a mobile device application or another Internet connected computer.
As an attacker, the first step of reconnaissance is locating Z-Wave HANs. A
likely approach is to use a Z-Wave sniffer [PLD14, BFH+15, HRRL16] to conduct
Z-Wave warwalking similar to what is done in [RMW12, KP12]. Next, the attacker
Table 3. Z-Wave gateway default configurations [FR15a].
Gateway Web UI SSH Web UI
Device Enabled Enabled Authentication
RaZberry Pi Yes No No
VeraEdge Yes Yes No
Almond+ No No Yes
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gains access to the WLAN by either associating with an unsecured network using
one of the many freely available tools to penetrate the WLAN defense. As previously
discussed, the likelihood of an unsecured or poorly secured WLAN is relatively high
(Section 2.4). Furthermore, the likelihood of an attacker gaining access to the target
WLAN is proportional to its insecurity.
After gaining access to the target network, network scanning is conducted using
Zenmap to locate the IP address of the target gateway device. However, before scan-
ning the network, fingerprints are needed to identify each device (Table 4). Using
tools similar to EZ-Wave [HRRL16], an attacker can perform network reconnaissance
to identify the make and model of the Z-Wave gateway and then conduct basic re-
search to identify fingerprints. If an attacker prefers stealth over speed the fingerprints
are used to reduce the search space, limiting the amount of traffic on the network.
This tactic creates less “noise” and improves the chance that the attack goes unno-
ticed. After locating the device, it is now possible to navigate to the gateway UI.
The RaZberry Pi Documentation, freely available on their website [RaZ15], lists the
UI location at Uniform Resource Locator (URL) http://x.x.x.x:8083 (x.x.x.x
denotes the IP address of Gateway 2), which confirms the Zenmap scan results (Fig-
Table 4. Z-Wave gateway fingerprints [FR15a].
Gateway Device Open Ports Unique Feature
RaZberry Pi 22*, 443 MAC address:
8083, 8084 (Raspberry Pi Foundation)
VeraEdge 80, 22, 53 OS: OpenWrt Barrier
49451 Breaker
Almond+ 80, 22*, OS: OpenWrt Kamikaze
8200** Backfire
*Open if SSH is enabled.
**Open if UPnP is enabled.
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Figure 10. Z-Wave devices that are connected to each gateway network: (a) smart
switch, (b) light module (c) door lock, and (d) water valve [FR15a].
ure 11). The UIs for Gateways 1 and 3 are located at URL http://y.y.y.y or
http://z.z.z.z, where y.y.y.y denotes the IP address of Gateway 1 and z.z.z.z
denotes the IP address of Gateway 3.
After navigating to each UI, Z-Wave HAN access is achieved for each gateway. It
is possible to actuate all Z-Wave devices from the UI. This approach seems somewhat
naive. If an attacker has access to the UI simultaneously with the user, the attack
will be discovered and the user will take immediate action. It is necessary to explore
additional options to remain inconspicuous while compromising the Z-Wave HAN.
3.2.2 Gateway Vulnerabilities.
During reconnaissance, it is observed that all gateway controllers use HTTP POST
and GET requests to send commands to their server, which in turn relays information
to the embedded Z-Wave chip that transmits wireless packets. This allows for the
capture and replay of HTTP request to the Z-Wave gateway using Burp Proxy. The
packets are accepted as legitimate requests as if from the UI. Modifying the packets
before retransmission allows actuation of all the devices on the network. For instance,
capturing requests sent to the smart switch could be easily modified to trigger a
motion detector or open a water valve. Similar attacks are demonstrated in [CBS13,
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Figure 11. Zenmap scan showing Gateway 2 (RaZberry Pi) fingerprints and the IP
address [FR15a].
OGPK13, BW15]. UI authentication credentials for the Almond+ are also captured
because they are transported in the clear. Some vendors have taken action to fix
discovered vulnerabilities [BW15], but multiple devices remain exploitable.
For the first time, exploits are demonstrated as found in [CBS13] on Gateway 1.
Crowley et al. [CBS13] are able to successfully retrieve the VeraLite (same manufac-
turer of Gateway 1) backup file for the entire system. The backup file is used in case
of a system malfunction. The user can reimage the system with the backup file to
restore it to the original user settings. An attacker can use the backup file to retrieve
passwords and sensitive system information that would aide their exploitation of
the target network. After navigating to http://y.y.y.y/cgi-bin/cmh/backup.sh
?external=1, the backup file is successfully downloaded from Gateway 1. Passwords
are stored in the backup file, including the SSH password. Since SSH is enabled
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(Table 4), Putty is used to login to the backend of Gateway 1. All other exploits
demonstrated in [CBS13] are also successfully replicated on Gateway 1. This con-
firms the hypothesis that some manufactures either cannot or will not find solutions
to existing vulnerabilities and that many of the same vulnerabilities exist in devices
from the same manufacturer. This exploit is also applied to Gateway 2. By navi-
gating to http://x.x.x.x:8083/ZWaveAPI/Backup, the attacker will download the
backup files that contain Z-Wave device information. This is useful if the attacker
wants to determine what types of devices are connected to the target Z-Wave HAN.
After testing exploits on all gateways under test that Crowley et al. [CBS13]
demonstrate on the VeraLite, it is evident that an attacker will need to exercise some
caution while manipulating the gateway UI. If the user becomes suspicious of an
attack, they can check the gateway log file that exists on all devices tested. The log
file keeps a record of all actions on the network. If an attacker attempts to perform
an unauthorized firmware update [CBS13, BW15], exploit insufficient authentication
checks on the gateway [CBS13], or other gateway attacks [OGPK13, BW15], all of
the activity is recorded in the log file. Every time the attacker takes an action, the
log file will capture the event. Once confirming their suspicion, the user takes action
and possibly disconnects the gateway from the Internet or disables it completely
preventing further access. Interestingly, this research finds that there is a way to gain
access to a Z-Wave gateway and create a persistent connection to all Z-Wave devices
while creating minimal log entries.
3.2.3 Adding a Rogue Controller to the Z-Wave Network.
In a Z-Wave HAN, if the user wants to add a new device to their network, the
controller is placed in inclusion mode. Inclusion occurs when the primary controller
(gateway device) in the Z-Wave HAN includes other devices in the network by as-
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signing them its Home ID. When the network owner sets the device they intend to
add in inclusion mode, the device accepts the Home ID of the controller and a new
Node ID and joins the HAN. In Z-Wave HANs, the user must physically activate the
inclusion mode on devices to add it to a network. However, there are two ways to put
the controller into inclusion mode: UI inclusion and physical access inclusion. Rogue
controller injection is demonstrated on the gateway devices using the UI inclusion
mode.
3.2.3.1 Gateway 1: Rogue Controller Injection.
Gateway 1 allows a user to perform inclusion from the UI. UI inclusion allows
a user to activate inclusion mode from the UI by the click of a button activating
an HTTP request packet that activates inclusion mode on the Z-Wave chip. Once in
inclusion mode, the gateway device is ready to accept the addition of any new devices.
This feature allows an attacker to gain access to the WLAN once and make a copy
of the Z-Wave HAN configuration, including Home ID and Node IDs. Doing so will
allow stealthy persistent access and full control of devices even if the user decides to
remove their gateway from the Internet.
To test this hypothesis, Gateway 1 is set to inclusion mode by injecting a previ-
ously captured HTTP packet creating one log entry. Once in inclusion mode, it is
possible to use an Aspire RF Wireless controller to copy information from the gate-
way controller by setting it to replicate mode. The Aspire RF Wireless controller
automatically connects to the gateway and, since the gateway is in inclusion mode, it
transfers all of its information to the Aspire RF Wireless controller, creating a second
log entry. The device settings on the Aspire RF Wireless controller now list many of
the devices of the target network. After adding the rogue controller to the network,
the UI displays the newly added device. The rogue controller is then deleted from the
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UI so it is not visible to the target user. This creates a third log entry. Deleting the
rogue controller from the HAN does not affect its access since Gateway 1 does not
validate device deletion or exclusion. Full control and access is maintained to most
devices while only creating three log entries.
3.2.3.2 Gateway 2: Rogue Controller Injection.
This exploit is attempted on Gateway 2. After injecting an inclusion packet to
the gateway, an attempt to replicate the Z-Wave HAN configuration is made. It
successfully connects to Gateway 2 and replicates the entire Z-Wave HAN configu-
ration. The rogue controller is used to actuate devices on the target network. An
attempt to remove the rogue controller from the UI is made but proves unsuccessful.
Gateway 2, unlike the Gateway 1, validates that device deletion or exclusion occurs.
Therefore, a device is only removed from the UI if it is actually removed from the
Z-Wave HAN. Two portable Z-Wave controllers, a primary and secondary, are used
to circumvent this Gateway 2 feature. An inclusion packet is sent to the target gate-
way. Once in inclusion mode, the secondary rogue controller is set to replicate mode,
then immediately activate replicate mode on the primary rogue controller. While the
secondary rogue controller is being included in the Z-Wave HAN, the primary rogue
controller sniffs all traffic between the gateway device and the secondary rogue con-
troller. Therefore, the primary rogue controller is never actually added to the Z-Wave
HAN; it only captures all its network information. The secondary rogue controller is
permanently excluded from Gateway 2 removing it from the UI. The primary rogue
controller has full access to most devices on the Z-Wave HAN.
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3.2.3.3 Gateway 3: Rogue Controller Injection.
Gateway 3 is unlike the previous devices. It requires the user to physically put
the controller into inclusion mode. Therefore, an attacker without physical access to
Gateway 3 is unable to inject a rogue device into the network.
The rogue controller injected in Gateways 1 and 2 only communicates in the sub-
GHz spectrum and not via HTTP requests (Figure 12). Any communication between
the new controller and Z-Wave devices goes undetected by both the HAN gateway
and legitimate users. Unlike previous exploits, even if the gateway looses power,
Internet connection, or the user willingly disconnects it from the WLAN, the rogue
controller has persistent access to the Z-Wave devices. Using EZ-Wave [HRRL16],
Figure 12. Actual test environment for rogue controller injection. (1) Represents the
Z-Wave gateway, (2-5) represents Z-Wave devices, and (6) represents the attacker.
Unlike previous gateway exploits, the rogue controller transmits commands directly to
Z-Wave devices, bypassing the gateway [FR15a].
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an attacker can accurately fingerprint Z-Wave devices that are vulnerable to rogue
controller injection and exploit them.
3.3 Hel Attack
Now that access to the Z-Wave gateway is achieved, another gateway exploit is
employed, the Hel Attack. Hel is coined because in old Norse mythology, Hel means
hidden [Ore03]. Since the attack involves hidden malware and hidden information in
a Z-Wave packet, Hel is a fitting title.
In order to conduct the Hel Attack in Z-Wave networks, it must be possible to
hide information in Z-Wave packets. Motivated by previous work that successfully
demonstrates this technique in IEEE 802.15.4 networks [MG10], this research fur-
ther investigate the feasibility of this technique in ITU-T G.9959-based networks,
specifically Z-Wave.
3.3.1 Information Hiding in the Z-Wave MAC Frame.
This work demonstrates the possibility of hiding data in the Z-Wave MAC frame
similar to what was accomplished in IEEE 802.15.4-based systems by [MG10]. As
discussed in Section 2.2, the MAC layer supports three frames. The maximum size
of the payload in each frame differs depending on the data rates and devices used.
Although newly released Gen5 Z-Wave devices can operate at rate R3, the focus is on
identifying positions to hide information in the MAC frame at rates R1 and R2 for sin-
glecast (acknowledgment messages are a subset of singlecast) and multicast messages
(Figure 13). The maximum packet size at rates R1 and R2 is 64B. This evaluation
represents the most challenging case for information hiding since the payload size
available to hide information at R1 and R2 are less than half of R3.
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Figure 13. Z-Wave MAC frame structure: (a) singlecast frame and (b) multicast frame.
[FRPR16].
Singlecast MAC frames includes the Home ID, Source ID, Frame Control, Length,
and Destination ID totaling 9B (Figure 13). A one-byte non-correcting frame check-
sum is used to validate the MAC frame for data rates R1 and R2 (2B are used for
R3). Given the channel configuration, the frame checksum of messages supported in
this experimental Z-Wave network is one byte. Thus, there are 54B remaining for the
MSDU (frame payload). A similar calculation is done to discover the maximum pay-
load length of the multicast frame (Figure 13). There are 39B used in the multicast
frame excluding the MSDU. Therefore, the MSDU is 25B.
3.3.2 Space Available to Hide Information.
The MSDU field has variable length and contains the frame payload information.
The length depends on the command being sent. Commands are specified in Z-Wave
Command Classes (Appendix A). The Command Class determines the function that
needs to be performed by a device. One example is the Basic Command Class which
is supported by all Z-Wave devices.
Since all devices, including the controller, will accept messages containing the
Basic Command Class [RaZ15], the length required in the MSDU for the Basic Com-
mand Class portion of the payload can be determined. This will provide necessary
information to calculate the available bytes remaining.
The representation of the Basic Command Class in the MAC frame is 0x20. The
Command following is dependent upon a SET (0x01), a GET (0x02), or a REPORT
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(0x03). After the Command, the Payload parameters follow and are no more than
one byte. In either case, the payload length needed to support the Basic Command
Class is 3B. Since all Z-Wave devices support the Basic Command Class, an attacker
can hide up to 51B of data in a singlecast MAC frame and up to 22B in a multicast
MAC frame when injected a packet using the Basic Command Class. When the Z-
Wave transceiver receives a packet, the header and EoF are stripped away as the
packet moves up the protocol stack. Once at the LLC Layer, the Command Class
function, Command, and Payload parameters are executed and hidden bytes are
ignored.
3.3.3 Hel Attack.
This section presents the first information hiding attack in a Z-Wave network.
The experiment setup includes the target gateway device, Gateway 2, on a WLAN
backbone, hardware and software components listed in Table 2, and the AFIT Sniffer.
It was shown in Section 3.2 and [FR15b] that it is possible to gain access to
the target Z-Wave gateway. After gaining access, the attacker uploads a Python
script that is then executed but sleeps for a time determined by the attacker (in
our experiment - ten minutes). When re-access to the Z-Wave network is needed,
the attacker first executes SSH server on their machine. Using Scapy-Radio [PLD14,
BFH+15], the attacker crafts a Z-Wave packet containing the hidden information and
transmits the packet to the Z-Wave gateway using an SDR. To ensure the injected
packet is accepted by the Z-Wave network, the attacker must first capture a Z-Wave
packet using tools such as those presented in [PLD14, BFH+15, HRRL16] and extract
the Home ID to construct a packet similar to the one in Figure 14. Lastly, the attacker
follows the ITU-T G.9959 specification and calculates the checksum using the eight-
bit checksum algorithm in (Algorithm 1).
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Figure 14. MAC frame consisting of (a) Home ID, (b) Source ID, (c) Frame Control,
(e) Length, (e) Destination ID, (f) Basic Command Class, Command, and Payload, (g)
hidden information in MSDU, and (h) Checksum. [FRPR16].
3.3.3.1 Hel Attack on Gateway 2.
This research demonstrates the Hel Attack on Gateway 2 (Figure 9). As a proof of
concept, Gateway 2 provides the system architecture needed to execute the malware,
written in Python 2.7. Although this attack is possible on other Z-Wave gateways,
malware would need to be written specifically for each gateway design.
The key to this attack is locating Z-Wave packets on the gateway controller.
Gateway 2 keeps a detailed log (Figure 15) that contains all actions on the Z-Wave
network. Once awake, the Python script scans the log file for any injected packet
containing the hidden information. The injected packet contains a marker (FE FE)
in the MSDU (Figure 14). This marker is used because it is unlikely that a standard Z-
Wave packet will contain consecutive byes FE. Upon identification, the Python script
dissects the packet retrieving needed information including the attack type (02) and
IP address (A2-56-C0-05). Any attack type can be added depending on the needs of
the attacker. Examples include Ping of Death to deny service or Reverse File Transfer
to retrieve the /etc/passwd file or other important files.
Algorithm 1 One-byte frame check sequence algorithm [ITU15].
procedure BYTE GenerateCheckSum(BYTE *Data, BYTE Length)
BYTE CheckSum = 0xFF
for Length > 0; Length−− do
Checksum = *Data++
end for
return Checksum
end procedure
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Figure 15. Gateway 2 log file. (a) Log representation of manipulated Z-Wave packet
containing information hidden in the MSDU. (1) Marker signifying that a packet
has been injected, (2) attack type, and (3) IP address in hexadecimal representing
162.86.192.5. (b) Log representation of legitimate Z-Wave Packet [FRPR16].
After retrieving the hidden information, the Python script clears the log file and
initiates a R-SSH client to the attack SSH server at IP address 162.86.192.5 (Fig-
ure 15). The attacker can now perform command line instructions as root user on
the target gateway allowing access to Z-Wave devices and WLAN devices (Figure 16).
Once complete, the attacker simply closes the connection which instructs the malware
to sleep for the predetermined time. Given enough compromised Z-Wave gateways,
an attacker can proceed with distributed attacks using the target gateways as botnets.
Botnets take the form of globally distributed networks consisting of slave devices that
act on the behest of the botmaster [SK14]. They are largely responsible for numerous
financially motivated crimes, spamming, and distributed denial of service attacks.
Although this attack was conducted within 20 meters of the target location, more
than enough distance for an attacker to remain inconspicuous, previous work demon-
strates the exploitation of WSN devices from 64 km away [AP13]. Given improved
tools, an attacker with this capability need not be in close proximity to the target
location to inject packets into the network.
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Figure 16. After the attacker executes a listening server, (a) a malicious Z-Wave packet
is injected to the gateway. When the Python script on the infected gateway detects
the injected frame, it retrieves the IP address and (b) opens a R-SSH. The attacker
now has full control of the Z-Wave gateway and access to WLAN devices [FRPR16].
3.4 Summary
The attacks presented illustrate the effects of the numerous gateway insecurities
and protocol vulnerabilities in Z-Wave networks. Both attacks provide control of
the Z-Wave network with relatively minimal probability of detection. Given the new
attacks illustrated herein: rogue controller injection and Hel attack, there is a need
for defensive countermeasures. This research therefore develops an MBIDS capable of
distinguishing between rogue devices and authorized devices, as well as manipulated
packets and correctly formed packets allowing for the first monitored Z-Wave network.
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology used to evaluate the MBIDS performance
using three different experiments: detection of rogue device attacks, detection of
manipulated packet injection attacks, and the increase misuse detection rate after
enhancing the tool. First, the problem definition, goals and hypotheses, and approach
are discussed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 defines the system boundaries. The system
and its services and outcomes are described in Section 4.4, followed by a detailed
description of the parameters and factors in Section 4.5. Performance metrics are
explained in Section 4.6. The evaluation technique is discussed in Section 4.7, followed
by a description of the design of experiments in Section 4.8.
4.2 Problem Definition
4.2.1 Goals and Hypotheses.
An objective of this research is to investigate vulnerabilities and to develop exploits
to establish the security implications of Z-Wave. Furthermore, given the established
exploits, countermeasures are needed. This research begins with the development of
an MBIDS hypothesized to detect device attacks and manipulated packet injection
attacks.
The research then answers the following questions:
• What are misuse cases in Z-Wave network transmissions?
• What is the effectiveness of the MBIDS at detecting rogue controller injection
attacks?
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• What is its effectiveness of the MBIDS at detecting packet manipulation attacks,
including the Hel Attack?
• Can the MBIDS be enhanced to increase the misuse detection rate through
packet state analysis and routed packet evaluations, respectively?
It is hypothesized that capturing Z-Wave packets and dissecting them for byte
evaluation as well as using open source documentation allows the development of
misuse cases after determining known-good cases. It is also hypothesized that because
rogue Z-Wave devices have a node ID that is not actually part of the Z-Wave network,
an IDS capable of gathering all valid node IDs is able to accurately validate group
membership. In addition, the system can be expanded to include evaluations of Z-
Wave Command Classes, Commands, and Payload parameters allowing the detection
of manipulated packet injection attacks, including the Hel Attack. Furthermore,
it is hypothesized that if all received packets with Source ID 0x01 are compared
with the Z-Wave gateway log file, the MBIDS accurately distinguishes between an
actual packet generated by the Z-Wave gateway and a maliciously injected packet.
Lastly, since routed packets are generated similarly to standard singlecast packets,
the MBIDS may improperly classify routed packets. It is therefore hypothesized that
reverse engineering the routing protocol allows for an in-depth dissection of routed
packets providing the MBIDS the ability to properly evaluate them.
4.2.2 Approach.
The MBIDS tool, MBIDS.py, evaluates packets captured by the AFIT Sniffer.
The tool uses signatures and states that are derived from an in depth study of Z-
Wave packet transmissions. After dissection, packets are compared with the ITU-T
G.9959 specification in order to further understand the byte fields. This allows the
development of the signature database and protocol states for packet comparison. The
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authors also employ the OpenZWave framework, an open-source project that reverse
engineered the closed-source serial application interface for communicating with the
Z-Wave chip [Ope14]. OpenZWave also provides partial support for 53 Command
Classes. Similarly, the Z-Way Developer’s Documentation also provides information
about 40 known Command Classes [RaZ15].
A realistic Z-Wave network is engineered with a gateway controller and multiple
devices on a WLAN backbone. The accuracy of the MBIDS is then tested against
two new attacks presented in Chapter III to evaluate the efficacy of this approach.
Figure 17 illustrates the overall functionality of the design. When the system
receives a packet, the following occurs:
1. Packets are captured by the AFIT Sniffer for evaluation by the packet monitor-
ing tool, MBIDS.py.
2. Upon receipt of the packet, the MBIDS dissects the packet and checks for a valid
checksum. If the checksum is not valid, the packet is immediately discarded. If
it is valid, further evaluation occurs.
The Z-Wave protocol automatically discards packets with invalid checksums,
so the Z-Wave gateway will not accept them. Therefore, the MBIDS does not
need to evaluate them.
3. The next item to evaluate is packet length. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the
maximum payload length while operating at R3 is 170B and 64B if operation
at R1 or R2. Therefore, if the packet is outside the normal bounds, it is a
misuse case since it violates standard packet length. In this case, an attacker
is attempting to inject significant amounts of data in one single packet. If the
packet length is valid, further evaluation occurs.
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4. Once the packet length is validated, group membership is then evaluated. Upon
initialization of the MBIDS, the Z-Wave gateway is polled for information.
When a device is included in the Z-Wave gateway, the gateway keeps a database
Figure 17. Packet data flow through the MBIDS. If the packet has an invalid checksum,
it will immediately be dropped. If the packet violates any misuse case, it is logged.
Otherwise, it is not a misuse case.
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containing all Node IDs and all Command Classes that each device supports.
Thus, the MBIDS can use this information to distinguish between a packet sent
from a device that is part of the group of trusted Z-Wave devices or not. If the
Source ID of the evaluated packet is identified as an existing node on the net-
work, further packet evaluation occurs, else, the packet is considered a misuse
case.
5. Next, the MBIDS evaluates the Destination ID field of the packet. If the Des-
tination ID is identified as an existing node on the network, further packet
evaluation occurs, else, the packet is considered a misuse case.
6. After group membership is confirmed, the MBIDS evaluates the Command
Class sent by a device. Individual Z-Wave devices support different Command
Classes. For example, a lamp module does not support the ALARM Command
Class and an alarm does not support a DOOR LOCK Command Class. Therefore,
if an attacker injects a packet with a valid Source ID and Destination ID, but
a Command Class that is not supported by the Destination ID on the Z-Wave
network, the packet is considered a misuse case. Otherwise, further evaluation
occurs.
7. Once the Command Class is validated, the Command is checked. Known Com-
mands are derived from OpenZWave and the Z-Way Developer’s Documenta-
tion. For example, the Basic Command Class only supports Commands SET,
GET, and REPORT. Any other Commands are invalid and considered a misuse
case.
8. Lastly, the MSDU is evaluated. The Command Class and Command are part of
the MSDU. Any byte field after the Command is referred to as the Payload. Al-
though a Command may be valid and its associated payload triggers an action,
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it is possible to pad extra bytes in the Payload that are ignored when received
by a Z-Wave gateway. If the Payload is invalid, it is considered a misuse case.
Otherwise, the packet is not (¬) a misuse case.
The Z-Wave protocol supports over 70 known Command Classes. In order to
develop an MBIDS, it is required that every Command Class is properly understood
to detect any violation of signatures or states (Signature-Based and Stateful Protocol
Analysis). As discussed, the Basic Command Class has three commands, SET, GET,
and REPORT. There are five combinations of Basic commands supported by the Z-
Wave protocol. As the most basic Command Class, Basic has the fewest commands
available. At a modest estimation, over 70 known Command Classes would allow for
over 2,000 possible combinations to account for in the MBIDS. Each Command Class
has a subsequence Command between 0x00 to 0xFF and Payload parameters 1B to
52B where each byte is a value 0x00 to 0xFF. Therefore, this work provides a proof of
concept with 11 of the most common Command Classes to illustrate the efficacy of
this approach. To this end, deep packet inspection of normal payloads is conducted
to develop known-good packet standards (signatures and states) that injected packets
are compared against.
This research does not fully consider the two-byte Frame Control field. The Frame
Control contains information defining the frame type and various flags. The Header
flag defines the type of frame that is sent. Frame types include singlecast, multicast,
and acknowledgment. There are also reserved bits the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation
states should not be used. Given this information, identifying known-good Frame
Control bytes seems trivial. However, some vendors disregard the reserved bits and
modify their protocol implementation to include unsupported Header types. For
example, the ITU-T G.9959 states that the Header type value 0x04 - 0x07 should
not be used [ITU15]. It is observed that Gateways 1 and 2 includes the reserve Header
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type 0x05. This one example illustrates the infeasibility of accounting for all known-
good Header types. Fully integrating Header types checks in the MBIDS increases
improper packet classification reducing the overall effectiveness of the system.
As show in Figure 18, this research is divided into three experiments: (i) evaluating
the effectiveness of the MBIDS to detect rogue devices including rogue controller
injection presented in Section 3.2, (ii) evaluating the effectiveness of the MBIDS to
detect manipulated packet injection attacks including the Hel attack as presented in
Section 3.3, and (iii) evaluating the enhancement strategy for increasing the mean
detection rate of the MBIDS. Each experiment consists of numerous tests that are
discussed in detail in Section 4.8, but a brief description is given below.
4.2.2.1 Experiment 1: Rogue Device Detection.
The first experiment evaluates the detection rate of the MBIDS against rogue
device attacks. This experiment is split into three parts. In each part, a series
of packets are injected to the Z-Wave network. Concurrently, the MBIDS captures
those packets and evaluates them for group membership violations (based on known
signatures) signifying a rogue device. The detection rate is calculated based on the
quantity of violations detected and logged versus the number of attack packets sent.
4.2.2.2 Experiment 2: Manipulated Packet Injection Detection.
The second experiment reveals whether the MBIDS is capable of detecting ma-
nipulated packet injection attacks against a Z-Wave network and then determines
the detection rate of the MBIDS against the attacks. A series of attack packets are
injected into the Z-Wave network. The MBIDS captures those packets and evaluates
them for any violations signifying a maliciously injected packet. The detection rate is
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calculated based on the quantity of violations detected and logged versus the number
of attack packets sent.
(a) Experiment 1
(b) Experiment 2
(c) Experiment 3
Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 18. Experiments and tests used to achieve the research goals. (a) Experiment
1 consists of 3 tests. (b) Experiment 2 consists of 7 tests. (c) Experiment 3 repeats
both previous experiments in order to compare results of the enhancement strategy
with previous results.
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4.2.2.3 Experiment 3: Detection Rate Post Enhancement.
Inevitably, with any IDS, there are packets that are falsely classified as normal.
The goal of any IDS is to detect violations while maximizing accurate classifications
and minimizing incorrect classifications. This is done by developing enhancement
strategies to accurately evaluated routed packets and re-evaluate improperly classified
packets for misuse.
As discussed in Section 2.6, Stateful Protocol Analysis can identify non-standard
sequence of commands. Using this method, captured packets that appear to be from
the controller (Source ID 0x01) are re-evaluated to ensure that the controller actually
sent them.
Although the MBIDS does not fully integrate Frame Control field checks, as a
proof of concept, it evaluates singlecast frames (Header Type 0x01). If a routed
frame is received, the Header Type is also 0x01 but the routed flag is set. When
this occurs, the MBIDS improperly classifies the packet as a singlecast frame with
Command Class 0x00 (No Operation - Appendix A) instead of a routed frame. After
reverse engineering the routing protocol, its evaluation is included in the MBIDS to
increase the misuse detection rate.
Experiments 1 and 2 are retested as subset tests of Experiment 3. The results of
Experiment 3 are compared with results from the first two experiments to determine
if the overall performance of the MBIDS has increased.
4.3 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the MBIDS, a monitoring tool for Z-Wave net-
works capable of detecting attacks presented in Chapter III and other packet ma-
nipulation attacks in Z-Wave networks. A block diagram of the SUT is illustrated
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Figure 19. System under test diagram for the MBIDS [FRPR16].
in Figure 19. The SUT consists of the Component Under Test (CUT): MBIDS.py
(packet evaluation software) and the AFIT Sniffer [BFH+15].
Workload parameters include crafted packets that are injected into the SUT. The
system parameters consist of the hardware and software components. These parame-
ters are discussed in detail in Section 4.5. The metrics used to evaluate the efficiency
of the MBIDS is the probability of packet capture of the AFIT Sniffer and the misuse
detection rate of MBIDS.py.
4.4 System Services and Outcomes
The service that the SUT provides is monitoring of Z-Wave networks where viola-
tions are detected and logged for further review by an administrator or investigator.
There are two outcomes for the SUT: success or failure. The service is successful
when, after capturing and parsing a received packet, the packet is deemed a known-
good packet or a misuse case. If it is a misuse case, the packet is logged for further
review by an administrator or investigator. The service is a failure when a packet is
52
completely missed by the packet capture device or the captured packet is incorrectly
classified.
4.5 Parameters and Factors
The parameters of the system are the properties which, if changed, impacts the
performance of the system. These include both workload parameters, which charac-
terize the workload and system parameters which characterize the system; parameters
that vary are called factors. The system and workload parameters of the SUT are
described below.
4.5.1 Workload Parameters.
The workload of the SUT consists of multiple factors. Factors include Packet
Length, Source ID, Destination ID, Command Class, Command, and Payload. Each
packet sent to the SUT is generated with varying factors in order to ensure the SUT is
being tested from a representative pool of all possible generated packets. The factors
are discussed in detail below.
4.5.1.1 Packet Length.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the Z-Wave MAC frame does not exceed 64B. There-
fore, when the MBIDS receives packets, the length is checked for validity. If it exceeds
64B, the packet is deemed invalid and the misuse is logged. When this factor is varied,
packets with different lengths are injected to the SUT.
4.5.1.2 Source ID and Destination ID.
The Z-Wave gateway under test keeps a record of all device Node IDs for each
device include in the network. When a packet is received, the MBIDS requests this
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information from the Z-Wave gateway and checks the Source ID and Destination ID
in the Z-Wave MAC frame. If they are invalid, the misuse is logged. Otherwise,
evaluation of the Command Class begins. The boundaries of this factor are Node IDs
0x01 to 0xE8 given 232 allowable nodes in any given Z-Wave HAN.
4.5.1.3 Command Class.
Each Z-Wave device supports specific command classes. For instance, a Z-Wave
door lock supports Command Class 0x62 but not Command Class 0x33 (Switch Color
Command Class). If the door lock receives a packet with Command Class 0x33 or
any other unsupported Command Class, the packet is classified as a misuse case
and logged. If the Command Class is supported, the Command parameter is then
evaluated. This factor varies depending on a choice of one of the 70 known Command
Classes (Appendix A).
4.5.1.4 Command.
The Command specifies one function within a specific Command Class. For ex-
ample, the Basic Command Class (0x20) supports three functions: SET or 0x01, GET
or 0x02, and REPORT or 0x03. When the Command Class is validated, the Command
is evaluated. Commands for all known Command Classes are listed in Appendix A.
4.5.1.5 Payload.
The next step in the evaluation of the Z-Wave MAC frames is Payload inspection.
After the Command has been verified as supported, the payload must be checked for
abnormalities. For example, if an attacker injects a packet into the network where
the MSDU is as shown in Figure 20, the MBIDS will classify it is as the Basic
Command Class (0x20) with a SET Command (0x01) and state on (0xFF). This
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requires an MSDU of length 3B but contains 10B. Therefore, the MBIDS will log
the misuse since the Payload is abnormal given the specified command class. After
the Command Class and Command have been selected, 52B remain in the MSDU
(Section 2.2). This variable factor consists of Payloads 1B to 52B.
4.5.2 System Parameters.
The system parameters include hardware and software components that are dis-
cussed in detail in Section 4.7. However, the primary components include the AFIT
Sniffer as a packet capture device and the IDS software tool for packet evaluation,
MBIDS.py.
4.6 Performance Metrics
In order for the system to be effective, it must have a high probability of success-
fully parsing and evaluating received packets for misuse cases. By extension, in order
for the system to successfully evaluate these packets, it must have the capability to
capture all traffic in the Z-Wave network, which necessitates the requirement of using
an effective packet capture device. Thus, the accuracy of the packet capture device
used in this experiment is evaluated.
Figure 20. Example payload of injected packet
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4.6.1 Packet Capture Device - AFIT Sniffer.
The AFIT Sniffer includes a USRP N210 and VERT900 3dBi antenna including
an extension of the software framework proposed in [PLD14]. The efficiency of the
AFIT Sniffer and Gateway 2 are tested to determine the best case misuse detection
rate of the MBIDS given the underlying packet capture device.
Five hundred tests are conducted on each device wherein each test consists of
sending one packet to Gateway 2. The mean packet reception rate for the Gateway 2
is 99.9% whereas the AFIT Sniffer maintains a mean packet reception rate of ≈ 94%
(Figure 21).
The RF front end on Gateway 2 is tuned per manufacturer specifications and is
more effective than the SDR. Given the ≈ 6% error rate of the AFIT Sniffer, it is
know a priori that the MBIDS will not detect 100% of manipulated packets even in
a perfect test. Therefore, in a realistic employment, the performance of the MBIDS
is considered with respect to the packet capture accuracy of the AFIT Sniffer or any
underlying SDR.
4.7 Evaluation Technique and Environment
This section discusses the experiment environment including software and hard-
ware components used and evaluation techniques used to conduct the experiments
and gather results for analysis.
4.7.1 Evaluation Techniques.
Overall, the results are evaluated by performing a statistical analysis of the per-
formance metrics. Standard statistics such as the standard deviation, mean, and 99%
confidence interval for all collected data are computed.
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Figure 21. Gateway 2 and AFIT Sniffer packet reception rates (99% confidence interval
for the mean) [FRPR16].
In all three experiments, collected data is binary, meaning that results are 1 for
captured packets correctly classified as misuse cases and 0 for packets classified as
known-good packets (whether properly or improperly classified). In Experiment 3,
the data from Experiments 1 and 2 are re-evaluated using the enhancement strategy.
4.7.2 Experimental Environment.
To conduct the three experiments outlined in Section 4.2.2, the experiment setup
is illustrated in Figure 22 and pictured in Figure 23. The setup consists of a target
network with components listed Table 5(a) and the attacker system with components
listed in Table 5(b).
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4.8 Design of Experiments
The overall design for this study consists of three experiments. The design consists
of a total of 6,000 trials, where each trial consists of a crafted packet sent to the Z-
Wave network. Because the underlying AFIT Sniffer is not 100% accurate at packet
capture, trials are conducted until the required number of packets are evaluated by
the MBIDS. Details of the trial distribution between the experiments and tests are
outlined below.
4.8.1 Experiment 1: Rogue Device Detection.
Experiment 1 consists of three tests totaling 900 trials. When a rogue device is
injected in a Z-Wave network, it receives a unique Node ID. An attacker uses two
portable rogue controllers and removes one from the network to cover their tracks
(Section 3.2). Therefore, the remaining rogue controller has a Node ID that is not
Figure 22. Block diagram of the experiment setup
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Figure 23. Actual experiment setup
represented on the Z-Wave gateway. The MBIDS verifies group membership by vali-
dating the Source ID and Destination ID in all received packets. If a packet is received
with invalid membership IDs, it is considered a misuse case. These tests, therefore,
ensure that candidates from all known possibilities are represented.
There are 232 nodes allowable in any Z-Wave network. An exhaustive test would
require 2322 trials to test every possible combination of Source ID and Destination
ID. As a proof of concept, this work scopes the trials to include a representative set
of all possible combinations. Since the MBIDS encoding uses conditional constructs,
the set of all possible combinations does not include a case where more than one byte
field is invalid. In a case where more than one byte field is invalid, the MBIDS logs
a misuse case based on the first invalid byte field discovered. This allows a packet to
be processed as quickly as possible. Combinations include:
• Test 1: Valid Source ID and Valid Destination ID
• Test 2: Valid Source ID and Invalid Destination ID
• Test 3: Invalid Source ID and Valid Destination ID
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Component Nomenclature Specifications
Wireless AP Cisco Aironet 1242AG 802.11a/b/g
Laptop
HP Elitebook 8570w
Intel Core i7-3720QM CPU
16 GB Ram & 64 bit
Operating System Ubuntu 14.04
Software frameworks
LiClipse 2.2.0.2 (Python 2.7)
AFIT Sniffer
MBIDS.py
Software-Defined USRP N210 DC - 6GHz
Radio VERT900 antenna sub-GHz 3dBi
Z-Wave
RaZberry Pi Z-Way version 2.0.0Controller
Z-Wave devices
Aeon Labs
-smart energy plug
Kwikset door lock -
Fortrezz water valve -
Everspring
-lamp module
(a) Target network components
Component Nomenclature Specifications
Laptop
HP Elitebook 8570w
Intel Core i7-3720QM CPU
16 GB Ram & 64 bit
Operating System Ubuntu 14.04
Software frameworks
LiClipse 2.2.0.2 (Python 2.7)
EZ-Wave
BurpProxy
Zenmap
Software-Defined HackRF One 1 MHz - 6 GHz
Radio VERT900 antenna sub-GHz 3dBi
(b) Attacker system components
Table 5. Experiment components include (a) target network components and
(b) attacker system components.
In Tests 1 and 2, the Source ID is randomly chosen from the valid Node IDs present
on the Z-Wave network (Figure 18(a)). In Test 1, the Destination ID is randomly
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generated from within the pool of known valid Node IDs. Conversely, in Test 2, the
Destination ID is randomly generated from a pool of all possible invalid Node IDs.
During Test 3, the Destination ID is randomly chosen from the list of valid Node
IDs, while the Source ID is randomly generated from all possible invalid Node IDs
(Figure 18(a)).
Three hundred trials are conducted for each test, where a trial consists of one
generated packet sent to the Z-Wave network and captured by the MBIDS. Although
it is possible to use a rouge controller to generate every packet, an SDR is used to
simulate rogue controller transmissions by crafting packets identical to rogue con-
troller packets and simply enumerate through the Source IDs and Destination IDs.
The results of this experiment provide the mean detection accuracy of the MBIDS.
When a rogue controller is added to the network, it must be removed from the
UI in order to evade user detection. As presented in Section 3.2, Gateway 1 allows
for UI device removal without actual exclusion. Therefore, the rogue controller can
be easily deleted from the UI on Gateway 1 while still maintaining access to the
network. To increase the difficulty of rogue controller injection, it is recommended
that gateway devices require device exclusion toward device removal from the UI.
Without this security feature, rogue controller injection becomes evident to the user.
With this feature, rogue devices are difficult to detect but the MBIDS is fully capable
of detection.
4.8.2 Experiment 2: Manipulated Packet Injection Detection.
Experiment 2 consists of seven tests totaling 2,100 trials (Figure 18(b)). Unlike
Experiment 1, not only does every possible combination of Source IDs and Destination
IDs have to be accounted for, but also Packet Lengths, Command Classes, Commands,
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and Payload parameters. The tests, therefore, ensure that candidates from all known
possibilities are represented. Possibilities include:
• Test 1: All valid byte fields.
• Test 2: Invalid Packet Length and all other fields valid.
• Test 3: Invalid Source ID and all other fields valid.
• Test 4: Invalid Destination ID and all other fields valid.
• Test 5: Invalid Command Class and all other fields valid.
• Test 6: Invalid Command and all other fields valid.
• Test 7: Invalid Payload and all other fields valid.
Given the MBIDS software framework, a packet with invalid Source ID and Com-
mand Class with all other parameters valid is not a valid combination. After an invalid
Source ID is checked, packet evaluation ceases and the misuse logs only records an
invalid Source ID.
All valid fields are selected from the known-good signatures collected for the
MBIDS. Invalid fields are randomly generated within accepted parameters for the
respective field. Although a Command Class is represented by a specific byte (e.g.,
0x32) and is any byte from 0x00 to 0xFF, if an attacker has requisite knowledge
of the Z-Wave protocol before attacking, worse case, they will use a proper Z-Wave
Command Class (Appendix A) to craft their packet. Therefore, Command Classes
are randomly selected from the list of known Command Classes. Three hundred trials
are conducted for each test, where a trial consists of one generated packet sent to the
Z-Wave network and captured by the MBIDS. The results of this experiment provide
the mean detection accuracy of the MBIDS.
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4.8.3 Experiment 3: Increased Detection Rate Post Enhancement.
Before conducting Experiment 3, the MBIDS is enhanced as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2. Enhancement files include Enhanced MBIDS.py and Z-Way-Server Comparator.py.
There are two enhancements. The first enhancement checks if a transmitted packet
should have a previous state. If it should, the current state of the transmitted packet
is compared with its required previous state. The second enhancement implements
an evaluation framework for routed frames.
4.8.3.1 Enhancement 1: Stateful Protocol Analysis.
In the Z-Wave gateway, when a packet is sent by the controller (State 1), a log
entry is created (State 2). To reduce incorrect packet classification, if a packet is
received by the MBIDS where the Source ID is 0x01, the packet is compared to the
gateway log file to check if it was actually sent by the controller. Hence, if State 2
exists, State 1 must precede it. Since all primary gateway controllers have a default
node ID 0x01, if a packet is captured with Source ID 0x01, it is from the controller.
If the gateway log file does not contain a message sent by the controller that was
captured by the MBIDS, the packet is malicious.
There is a slight delay from packet transmission to packet log; since Gateway 2
is used for this experiment, a ≈ 10 second delay is observed. The MBIDS logs all
malicious packets for further review but also logs packets it receives and classifies
as normal. If any packets that are classified as normal contain Source ID 0x01, this
enhancement strategy re-evaluates the packets after a < 10 second delay. This ensures
that if the packets are in fact sent by the controller, every State 2 has a corresponding
State 1. Conversely, if the packets are not sent by the controller, there are missing
States 1 classifying the packets as misuse cases.
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Figure 24. Signature-Based intrusion detection and stateful protocol analysis are sub-
sets of an MBIDS. If any packet received is classified as a valid packet, the packet is
re-evaluated using stateful protocol analysis to ensure validity.
Secondly, if a packet contains Source ID and Destination ID that are equal, the
packet is a misuse case. In Local Area Network Denial (LAND) attack, the Source
and Destination information in the TCP segment are the same. The target machine
crashes or freezes because the packet is continually processed by the TCP stack.
Although similar to a LAND attack, there are no effects of equal Source ID and
Destination ID in Z-Wave networks. If a device with Node ID 0x05 receives a packet
with Source ID 0x05, it accepts the packet and executes the commands in the MSDU.
To detect this attack, if a packet is classified as a valid packet, but contains equal
Source ID and Destination ID, it is reclassified as a misuse case.
Figure 24 illustrates the logical topology of the MBIDS with the enhancement
strategy. Valid packets are re-evaluated based on their state. If the state is invalid,
the packet is reclassified as a misuse case.
4.8.3.2 Enhancement 2: Routing Frame Evaluation.
When a routed Z-Wave frame is received by the MBIDS pre-enhancement, it is
classified incorrectly. Before the routed frame evaluation is added to the MBIDS,
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the routed frame is evaluated as seen in Sub-Figure 25(i). The (a) Home ID, (b)
Source ID, (c) Frame Control, (d) Length, (e) Destination ID, and (g) Checksum are
correctly evaluated. The Payload (f) is improperly evaluated. The first byte of the
Payload 0x00 is considered the No Operation Command Class followed by variable
parameters. However, 0x00 is actually the header for a routed payload.
Sub-Figure 25(ii) illustrates a proper routed frame evaluation provided by the
enhancement strategy. As before, (a) through (e) and (j) are classified correctly.
However, (f) is the routed frame header, (g) is split into two nibbles where nibble 1
is the hop count (3) and nibble 2 is the quantity of hops already completed (0). The
next byte fields (h) consists of the nodes in the route that the packet goes through.
When the packet gets to its final destination Node ID 0x05, the hop count is 3,
and (i) is executed as a Binary Switch Command Class 0x25, with Command SET
(0x01) and Payload Parameter ON (0xFF). The example mesh network is illustrated
in Figure 26. The Z-Wave gateway (Node ID 0x01) sends a command to destination
Node ID 0x05 through nodes 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04.
Given this new evaluation, the MBIDS can ensure the nodes in the route actually
exist on the Z-Wave network by verifying group membership. The MBIDS also ensures
that the destination node supports the Command Class sent.
(i) Pre-Enhanement Frame Classification
(ii) Post-Enhanement Frame Classification
Figure 25. Routed Frame pre and post enhancement classification.
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[30][02 03 04]... [31][02 03 04]... [32][02 03 04]... [33][02 03 04]...
Figure 26. Z-Wave mesh topology routing. Node 0x01 sends a routed packet to Node
0x05. The hop counter is steadily incremented until the final destination is reached.
After enhancement, the data collected from Experiments 1 and 2 are re-evaluated
(Test 1 and Test 2, respectively) totaling 3,000 trials. Results of Tests 1 and 2 are
compared with the results from Experiments 1 and 2 to calculate the post enhance-
ment differences in detection rates.
4.9 Summary
The chapter discusses the methodology used to test the efficiency of the MBIDS
under various workloads. Performance is evaluated using a real-world experimental
design and is based on our performance metric: mean misuse detection rate. Three
experiments are performed to measure the detection rate of the MBIDS and the
impact of the enhancement on the overall system.
Experiments 1 and 2 use the MBIDS.py script in order to receive captured packets
from the AFIT Sniffer and evaluate them for any malicious content. Malicious con-
tent includes invalid Packet Length, Source ID, Destination ID, Command Class, or
Payload. When detected, the malicious content is logged for review by an investigator
or system administrator.
Experiment 3 uses Enhanced MBIDS.py to receive captured packets from the
AFIT sniffer and evaluate them for any misuse cases. Any packets that are not
misuse cases are re-evaluated using the Z-Way-Server Comparator.py.
After the trials are complete for Experiments 1 and 2, the mean detection rate
is calculated with a 99% confidence interval. After system enhancement, the data
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from Experiments 1 and 2 are re-evaluated as Experiment 3. The third experiment
measures the hypothesized increase in detection rate.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and analyzes the results of the experiments. The results
and analysis of Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are presented in Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4,
respectively. Lastly proposed in Section 5.5 is a list of defense-in-depth strategies
enabling a user to harden the security of their insecure Z-Wave network.
5.2 Results and Analysis of Experiment 1
5.2.1 Test 1: Valid Source ID and Destination ID.
The first test performed on the system is used to determine the detection accuracy
of the MBIDS at capturing rogue device packets. These packets include both valid
Source IDs an Destination IDs (Figure 27). This test is considered the control/base-
line test and establishes that the MBIDS is powered, responsive, and accepts valid
packets, such as authorized network transmissions. Although a rogue device does not
have a valid Source ID, as discussed in Section 3.2, packets with a valid Source ID
are still injected to the Z-Wave network to ensure the MBIDS responds accurately.
Results of Test 1 are as anticipated. After 300 trials, the MBIDS detects zero
violations in packets with valid Source ID and Destination ID. Since it is established
the MBIDS responds correctly to packets containing both valid Source ID and Des-
tination ID, subsequent tests are accomplished to evaluate remaining combinations.
Valid byte field, Not part of the trial
Figure 27. Experiment 1 - Test 1 packet structure.
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5.2.2 Test 2: Valid Source ID and invalid Destination ID.
Test 2 provides the mean detection rate for injected packets containing valid
Source ID and invalid Destination ID (Figure 28). When a rogue controller is added
to a Z-Wave HAN, it receives a unique Node ID from the gateway and is capable of
communicating with networked devices. This is possible because the rogue controller
replicates the network receiving a list of Node IDs. Therefore, any commands sent
from the rogue controller are sent to a valid node on the network, meaning the trans-
mitted packet has a valid Destination ID. As a result, no packets generated by the
rogue controller contain an invalid Destination ID. Although this packet with valid
Source ID and invalid Destination ID is not likely concerning rogue controller packets,
it represents an invalid group membership possibility that must be accounted for.
Results of Test 2 are also as anticipated. After 300 trials, the mean detection rate
is 100% for all received packets with invalid Destination IDs.
5.2.3 Test 3: Invalid Source ID and valid Destination ID.
When two rogue controllers are used to conduct rogue controller injection, only
one is actually added to the network and is excluded while the other rogue controller
maintains access to the Z-Wave devices. Because of exclusion, the remaining rogue
controller will have an invalid Source ID but still capable of communicating with
nodes on the network because it has the correct Home ID. Therefore, every packet
generated by the rogue controller will have an invalid Source ID and valid Destination
ID (Figure 29).
Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 28. Experiment 1 - Test 2 packet structure.
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After 300 trials, there is a mean detection rate of 100% for packets with invalid
Source ID and valid Destination ID. This is the most realistic test for detecting rogue
devices in Z-Wave networks. Given the results, an attacker is unable to use a rogue
device without detection. Table 6 lists the total results for Experiment 1.
Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 29. Experiment 1 - Test 3 packet structure.
Table 6. Results of Experiment 1. The detection rule corresponds to the byte fields
tested.
Detection Detection
Test Trials Rule1 Rate (x¯)
1 300
if (Source ID & Destination ID) == Valid:
N/A2¬ misuse-case
2 300
if Destination ID != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
3 300
if Source ID != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
Overall x¯ 900 - 100%
1Conditional Constructs.
2Packets with valid fields are do not violate any misuse cases.
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5.3 Results and Analysis of Experiment 2
5.3.1 Test 1: All Valid Byte Fields.
This test is similar to Experiment 1 Test 1. In this test, all six fields are valid
in order to ensure the MBIDS does not classify the packet as a misuse case (Fig-
ure 30). In the attack scenario presented in Section 3.3 or similar attacks, an attacker
injects a packet with valid parameters but also attempts to hide information. Since a
manipulated injected packet will contain some misuse casec, this test does not demon-
strate detection against a covert channel attack. However, it is necessary to evaluate
the MBIDS for correctness. This test is therefore the first step in validation and
verification of the system to ensure correct engineering.
After 300 trials, the results of this test demonstrate that the MBIDS evaluates
all fields in the injected packet and determines them not to violate any misuse cases.
Further validation and verification can occur to ensure that malicious packets are
detected.
5.3.2 Test 2: Invalid Packet Length.
In Test 2, the injected packet contains an invalid Packet Length (Figure 31). As
previously mentioned, in this case, an attacker is likely attempting to inject a packet
padded with large amounts of data. The evaluation of packets sent at data rates R1
and R2 restricts the length to 64B. All injected packets are >64B length to test the
detection accuracy of the MBIDS against packets that are too large.
Valid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 30. Experiment 2 - Test 1 packet structure.
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Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 31. Experiment 2 - Test 2 packet structure.
Test 2 provides a mean detection rate of 100% for 300 injected packets containing
an invalid Packet Length. When a packet is received, it is parsed and the length is
extracted and compared to the maximum allowable length. The attacker can attempt
to obviate this measure by changing the length in a crafted packet to an allowable
value. However, when a Z-Wave transceiver receives a packet, it checks the length
and reads the quantity of bytes corresponding to the length. If the length is changed
to a value allowable but does not represent the actual length of the packet, the Z-
Wave transceiver does not read the entire packet and the last byte is considered the
checksum. Since it is not the checksum, it is considered an invalid checksum and
the packet is dropped. The length of any injected packet must represent the actual
length of the packet in order to be accepted by a Z-Wave transceiver, but if it is an
accurate length and greater than the maximum allowable length, it is classified as a
misuse case by the MBIDS.
5.3.3 Test 3 and 4: Invalid Source ID or Invalid Destination ID.
Tests 3 and 4 provide the mean detection rate for injected packets containing
an invalid Source ID or Destination ID (Figure 32). Similar to Tests 2 and 3 in
Experiment 1, 300 packets are injected for each invalid field. Results for each test are
as expected. The MBIDS achieves a 100% mean detection rate for each test.
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(a) Test 3
(b) Test 4
Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 32. Experiment 2 - Test 3 and 4 packet structure.
5.3.4 Test 5 and 6: Invalid Command Class or Invalid Command.
After an attacker gains access to a Z-Wave HAN, as illustrated in Section 3.2, they
may discover valid Node IDs on the network. However, without knowledge of the exact
types of devices, an attacker is unaware of the types of Command Classes that each
device supports. Without this knowledge, an attacker crafts a packet with an invalid
Command Class (Figure 33a). If the packet is sent to a Node ID that represents
a slave node on the network, the device accepts the packet, does not perform the
Command Class function, and responds with an acknowledgment. However, if an
attacker sends the packet to the gateway, the gateway responds similarly, but also
stores the communication messages in its log file. This is precisely how the Hel Attack
is accomplished. Therefore, the Command Class is checked for validity.
(a) Test 5
(b) Test 6
Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 33. Experiment 2 - Test 5 and 6 packet structure.
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The same applies to a Command (Figure 33(b)). Without prior knowledge of a
specific device on the Z-Wave HAN, not only will the attacker not know the Command
Class but also the corresponding Command.
After 300 trials, the MBIDS has a mean detection rate of 100% at detecting
injected packets with unsupported Command Classes. The MBIDS also has a mean
detection rate of 100% at detecting 300 injected packets with invalid Commands.
5.3.5 Test 7: Invalid Payload.
The maximum size of the MSDU is 54B (Section 2.2). After the Command Class
and Command are chosen, 52B remain. The Payload is randomly generated between
length 1B to 52B and concatenated to the Command Class and Command before
packet injection. This ensures a valid Packet Length but the Payload contains random
invalid byte manipulations (Figure 34).
After 300 trials, the MBIDS results in a 91.7% mean detection rate for packets
with manipulated payloads. When packets are received and evaluated, the misuses
are logged but the packets that are not considered misuse cases are also logged. This
allows a for review and analytics of why some manipulated injected packets are not
flagged as a misuse case.
Further analysis revealed that of the 11 implemented Command Classes: Con-
figuration, Association, Version, and Security (Appendix A) Command Classes have
too much variability to account for all possible combinations. Therefore, in this proof
of concept, it is demonstrated that although the MBIDS cannot detect all packet
Valid byte field, Invalid byte field, Not part of the trial.
Figure 34. Experiment 2 - Test 7 packet structure.
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manipulation attacks with 100% accuracy given the variability of payload parame-
ters, given detailed proprietary information, the MBIDS can be fully implemented to
achieve 100% accuracy.
Table 7 lists a 100% mean detection rate of invalid Packet Length, Source ID, Des-
tination ID, Command Class, and Command. All validation checks in the MBIDS are
deterministic and are sure to detect violations. As an analogy, a door lock manufac-
turer engineers a door lock to only accept one cut of key. Any other cuts used should
not work. The manufacturer is sure of the design but still tests nonstandard possibil-
ities to ensure the door lock operates as intended. Similarly, unsupported values are
tested knowing the outcome but need to ensure MBIDS.py is engineered correctly.
Table 7. Results of Experiment 2. The detection rule corresponds to the byte fields
tested.
Detection Detection
Test Trials Rule1 Rate (x¯)
1 300
if (All Byte Fields) == Valid:
N/A2¬ misuse-case
2 300
if Packet Length != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
3 300
if Source ID != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
4 300
if Destination ID != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
5 300
if Command Class != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
6 300
if Command != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
7 300
if Payload != Valid:
[88.5− 94.8%]
LogFile += misuse-case
Overall x¯ 2,100 - [98.3− 99.2%]
1Conditional Constructs.
2Packets with valid fields are do not violate any misuse cases.
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If the attacker is not aware of the Source ID, Destination ID, valid Packet Length,
Command Class, or Command, they are likely to inject a packet with nonstandard
values and will certainly be detected and logged as a misuse case.
Of the six workload parameters tested, only one does not result in 100% detection
(Table 7). Packets with invalid Payloads are detected with a mean of 91.7%. Con-
ducting 2,100 tests of independent packet transmissions with invalid Packet Length,
Source ID, Destination ID, Command Class, Command, and Payload results in an
overall accuracy of 98.8% mean misuse detection rate.
5.4 Results and Analysis of Experiment 3
5.4.1 Test 1: Re-Evaluation of Experiment 1.
Both enhancement strategies are targeted at re-evaluating packets that are im-
properly classified as having all valid byte fields. However, given the mean rogue
device detection rate is 100% pre-enhancement, Experiment 1 is only re-evaluated
to ensure the enhancement strategies proposed in Enhanced MBIDS.py and Z-Way-
Server Comparator.py are engineered correctly and do not affect previous results.
Results are consistent with those in Table 6, confirming the MBIDS is capable of
detecting rogue device attacks in Z-Wave networks with 100% mean detection rate.
5.4.2 Test 2: Re-Evaluation of Experiment 2.
Similarly to Test 1, the enhancement strategies target previously evaluated packets
that are incorrectly classified as normal, specifically the Payload. Therefore, all results
after re-evaluation are consistent with those in Table 7 with the exception of the mean
misuse detection rate for invalid Payloads.
After re-evaluation, the mean invalid Payload detection rate increases to 95.7%,
a 4% improvement. Of the 300 trials, Enhanced MBIDS.py evaluates 25 packets as
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valid even though all are invalid. If any of the 25 packets have Source ID 0x01 or
Source ID equal to Destination ID, the packet is logged in a secondary logfile for
re-evaluation. The secondary logfile is scanned by Z-Way-Server Comparator.py. Of
the 12 packets that are logged in the secondary logfile, Z-Way-Server Comparator.py
classifies all of them as having either equal Source ID and Destination ID or a packet
with Source ID 0x01 that was actually sent by the Z-Wave gateway controller. The
improved results of Experiment 3 Test 2 are listed in Table 8.
5.5 Defense-in-depth Strategies
An MBIDS is a effective means of detecting attacks in Z-Wave networks. However,
because of the insecurity of many gateway devices, users must consider defense in
depth to secure any means by which gateways are accessed. As discussed in Section
2.4, there are three ways to gain access to a gateway device. Of the three ways,
compromise of the WLAN backbone is the most common, since an attacker can remain
inconspicuous while attacking the target network. As the most viable means of entry,
the WLAN provides a single point of access. Therefore, end users must ensure the
WLAN backbone is secure. This sections proposes defense-in-depth strategies that
aides users in securing their Z-Wave HANs.
5.5.1 Hide WLAN SSID.
The first step in exploiting the HAN is gaining access to the target WLAN. Hiding
the service set identifier (SSID) slows attackers using passive network scans to locate
the WLAN. This option can be configured in the wireless access point settings. If an
attacker conducts Z-Wave warwalking and locates a Z-Wave network, but is not able
to identify the SSID, the attacker is hindered from authenticating to the WLAN and
attack the globally accessible Z-Wave gateway.
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5.5.2 WLAN security with a robust password.
Some WLANs are left unsecured, granting attackers uninhibited access. Secondly,
some WLANs use WEP to secure their network because they require backward com-
Table 8. Results of Experiment 3 - Test 2. The detection rule corresponds to byte
fields tested.
Detection Detection
Test Trials Rule1 Rate (x¯)
1 300
if (All Byte Fields) == Valid:
N/A2¬ misuse-case
2 300
if Packet Length != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
3 300
if Source ID != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
4 300
if Destination ID != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
5 300
if Command Class != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
6 300
if Command != Valid:
100%
LogFile += misuse-case
Enhanced MBIDS.py
7 300
if Payload != Valid:
[93.3− 97.9%]
LogFile += misuse-case
else:
SecondaryLog += valid-case
Z-Way-Server Comparator.py
if Source ID == Destination:
LogFile += misuse-case
else if Source ID == 0x01
& Packet /∈ GatewayLog:
LogFile += misuse-case
Overall x¯ 2,100 - [99.0− 99.7%]
1Conditional Constructs.
2Packets with valid fields are do not violate any misuse cases.
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patibility with legacy devices or the user is not aware of existing vulnerabilities. If
possible, WPA2 should be used since WEP is easily exploitable. A 128-bit WEP key
can be cracked in just three minutes with freely available tools such as aircrack-ng
[RSRR+10]. Weak passwords should be avoided because numerous free dictionaries
containing precomputed passwords can be found on the Internet. An attacker armed
with an Alfa AWUS036H Card, aircrack-ng, and a large password dictionary can crack
weak WPA2 passwords. Although longer and more complex passwords are breakable,
they take significantly longer to crack than weak passwords. A simple calculation can
be used to estimate the maximum time required to brute force crack passwords (3).
timetaken(seconds) =
combinations
guesses/second
(1)
Using case sensitive passwords consisting of 94 available characters, Table 9 lists
the maximum cracking times, assuming the computer calculates a modest 5,000,000
guesses per second. Password dictionaries can significantly reduce the time taken to
crack passwords, so users should choose passwords that are as long and complex as
practicable.
5.5.3 MAC address filtering.
MAC address filtering allows the administrator to select specific devices that are
trusted on the WLAN. Although the attacker can spoof MAC addresses, this is an
additional barrier for WLAN defense in depth. This can also be configured in the
wireless access point settings. If MAC address filtering is enabled, an attacker without
knowledge of spoofing MAC addresses will not be able to authenticate to the WLAN,
even if armed with the WLAN password.
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5.5.4 Enable UI authentication on the Z-Wave gateway.
Not all Z-Wave gateways have UI authentication. However, if UI authentication is
available, the user should enable it and create a strong password. Many of the vulner-
abilities exploited in [CBS13] do not work on the recently released Almond+. With
mandatory UI authentication, an attacker would have to intercept HTTP packets
while the user is logging in to capture credentials since some gateways send pass-
words in the clear. UI authentication is clearly not enough, but it encumbers an
attacker. Even though it is possible to capture the Almond+ UI authentication cre-
dentials, the exploits available are limited because the Almond+ architecture provides
extra security. Not being able to put the Almond+ into inclusion mode from the UI
prevents the injection of a rogue controller into the network.
5.5.5 Use a Reverse Proxy Server.
A Reverse Proxy Server (RPS) is an intermediary application between the user
and the gateway. It provides an added layer of security by intercepting packets sent to
the gateway and performs additional authentication before allowing the user to access
Table 9. Brute Force Password Cracking [FR15a].
Characters Combinations Time taken @ 5× 106 guesses/sec
1 94 0.00002 seconds
2 8, 836 0.00177 seconds
830, 534 0.16612 seconds
4 78, 074, 896 15.6145 seconds
5 7.3× 109 25 minutes
6 6.9× 1011 38 hours
7 6.4× 1013 150 days
8 6× 1015 38 years
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the gateway. This is a effective option for gateways that do not have UI authentication
and provides increased UI security for those that already have authentication. RPS
tools such as NGINX are free and available for download.
5.5.6 Disable unused network services.
Gateway administrators should also ensure that any unused network services are
disabled. If there is not a need to have continual access to the gateway backend,
SSH should be disabled when not in use. SSH is enabled by default on the VeraEdge
Home Controller. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, after downloading the backup file
and locating the WLAN password, the attacker successfully logs into the backend of
the VeraEdge using Putty with username root and password <wlan password>. This
vulnerability is avoided if SSH is disabled.
5.5.7 Enable end-device encryption.
When a rogue controller is added to the network, it can control most devices
except those that use encryption. When a device that uses encryption is included
into the Z-Wave network, the device sends its encryption key to the gateway. A chain
of trust is then established between those two devices. When a rogue controller is
added, the chain of trust does not extend to the rogue controller because the end
device is not aware of its inclusion. Some Z-Wave devices, including Gen5 models,
come with the option to enable encryption with the press of a button. Enabling end
device encryption may mitigate rogue controller attacks.
5.5.8 Inspect log files.
Although it is possible for an attacker to clear log files to cover their tracks after
compromising the Z-Wave HAN, it is still worth inspecting the log files for unusual
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activity. Any actuation of devices at abnormal hours and failed login attempts is
recorded in the log. If this is found, the user should reset their gateway and change
their passwords.
Applying these mitigation strategies will not only deter an attacker but decrease
the attack surface, lessening the chance of a successful Z-Wave HAN exploitation.
5.6 Summary
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected from each of the experi-
ments. A statistical analysis of the performance metrics in each experiment is per-
formed. Then, a list of defense-in-depth strategies to aide in defending a Z-Wave
network is provided. The results show that the enhancement strategy increases the
mean misuse detection rate of packets with invalid Payloads to 95.7%. Therefore, the
mean detecting accuracy of the MBIDS after enhancement is 99.4% for all byte fields
tested.
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VI. Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the overall conclusions drawn from the research. Section 6.2
compares each research goal with the experiment results and determines if the research
objectives have been met. The significance of this research is discussed in Section 6.3.
Section 6.4 provides several recommendations for future work. Finally, Section 6.5
provides the source code used in this research.
6.2 Conclusions of Research
6.2.1 Goal 1: Misuse Case Identification.
The first goal of this research is to identify misuse cases in order to develop an
MBIDS. A Z-Wave-capable SDR is used to capture packets. The packets are dissected
and each byte field is evaluated using the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation [ITU15]
and open source documentation including OpenZWave [Ope14] and the RaZberry Pi
documentation [RaZ15]. As a proprietary protocol, discovering all misuse cases is
possible given proprietary information. Therefore, misuse cases are determined for 11
of the known Z-Wave Command Classes and their corresponding Payload parameters.
This allows the engineering of conditional constructs used for packet evaluation. The
first goal is accomplished toward achievement of subsequent goals.
6.2.2 Goal 2: Rogue Device Detection.
The second goal of this research is to engineer a system, an MBIDS, that captures
and analyzes Z-Wave transmissions against a lists of signatures and states determining
whether the captured packets are valid. The MBIDS is then evaluated based on the
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ability to detect, and efficiency of detecting rogue device attacks in Z-Wave networks.
To accomplish this goal, the AFIT Sniffer [BFH+15] is used to capture packets. The
packets are read in by the MBIDS and evaluated for violation. By dissecting the
packets and comparing the Source ID and Destination ID with a list of known Node
IDs retrieved from the Z-Wave gateway, the MBIDS is able to detect rogue device
attacks with a 100% mean detection rate accomplishing the second research goal.
6.2.3 Goal 3: Manipulated Injected Packet Detection.
The third goal of this research is to determine the efficiency of the MBIDS at
detecting manipulated injected Z-Wave packets. Using an SDR as an attacker, nu-
merous manipulated packets are injected into the Z-Wave network containing invalid
Packet Length, Source ID, Destination ID, Command Class, Command, or Payload.
Of the six byte fields modified to be invalid, all but one results in a mean detection
rate of 100%. The packets with invalid Payloads are detected on average 91.7%. The
overall efficiency of the MBIDS given the mean detection rate of 100% for five of
the evaluated fields and a 91.7% mean detection rate for one evaluated field results
in an overall mean detection rate of 98.8% The results confirm the hypothesis and
accomplishing the third research goal.
6.2.4 Goal 4: Enhanced MBIDS.
The final goal of this research is to enhance the MBIDS to increase the misuse
detection rate. The mesh routing protocol is reverse engineered, allowing the MBIDS
to properly evaluate routed frames. Secondly, the Z-Wave protocol allows for devices
to accept packets with an equal Source ID and Destination ID, although this is only
present during packet injection attacks. Therefore, the MBIDS is enhanced to check
for this condition and classify it as a misuse case. Lastly, when a packet that is
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a misuse case is improperly classified, if the Source ID is 0x01, the packet is re-
evaluated. If it is not in the Z-Wave gateway logfile, it is reclassified as a misuse
case.
Results of Experiment 1 cannot be improved, so the enhancement strategies are
solely tested against rogue device attacks. Results of rogue device attack detection
using the enhancement strategies are consistent with the results pre-enhancement.
To evaluate the enhancement strategies at detecting manipulated injected packet
attacks the six byte fields are modified to be invalid. Injected packets with invalid
byte fields result in a mean detection rate of 100% for five of the byte fields (Packet
Length, Source ID, Destination ID, Command Class, and Command) and 95.7% mean
detection rate for packets with invalid Payloads. Therefore, the overall efficiency of
the MBIDS is a mean detection rate of 99% accomplishing the final research goal.
6.3 Significance of Research
The significance of this research can be approached in two ways. First, a discussion
of the novel attacks presented herein. The second is to discuss the intrinsic value of
the MBIDS as a monitoring tool for Z-Wave networks. When fully extended to include
support for all Command Classes, the MBIDS is a tool fully capable of monitoring
Z-Wave networks.
6.3.1 Z-Wave Network Attacks.
The newly discovered attacks presented herein illustrate the numerous insecurities
in Z-Wave gateways and the underlying protocol. The ability to inject rogue devices
into a Z-Wave network, especially controller devices, poses a serious threat to Z-Wave
network users. Given that there are no publicly available sub-GHz traffic analyzers
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for Z-Wave networks, an attacker using a rogue device in a Z-Wave network cannot
be detected while communicating in the Z-Wave RF spectrum.
Based on the ITU-T G.9959 specification, the Z-Wave protocol ensures packets
are no more than 64B while operating at 9.6 kbps or 40 kpbs data rates and 170B
while operating at data rate 100 kbps. However, an attacker can craft a packet that is
smaller than the allowable bounds and pad extra bytes until the threshold is reached.
This provides a covert channel in Z-Wave packets to hide information. Using this
covert channel and Z-Wave gateways insecurities, the Hel Attack is created whereby
the attacker injects a packet in the Z-Wave network with hidden information that
triggers a R-SSH to any Internet connected computer the attacker chooses. This
backdoor into the gateway not only provides Z-Wave network control, but allows
allows access to other WLAN connected devices. Motivated by these attacks, the
MIBDS is developed to detect rogue device attacks, covert channel attacks, and other
packet injection attack in Z-Wave networks.
6.3.2 MBIDS Employed.
This research provides the DoD and other government agencies with an effective
method to detect Z-Wave network attacks. This system is the first of its kind and
demonstrates a proof of concept approach to detecting rogue device attacks and ma-
nipulated packet injection attacks. Enhancements to the system include detection of
known-good packets from a spoofed controller. By designing the system to operate
on any computer that supports Python 2.7, it can be easily implemented using any
SDR configured for Z-Wave packet capture. The determinism of the MBIDS enables
it to run at high speeds, ensuring a high probability of successful packet classification
even when monitoring a heavily utilized Z-Wave network. Because the MBIDS works
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in parallel with the Z-Wave network (Figure 35), any failure has no negative effects
on network performance.
The MBIDS supports 11 of the known command classes. When fully implemented,
the MBIDS is an effective monitoring and detection tool against Z-Wave network
attacks. By validating group membership and evaluating byte fields in Z-Wave frames
based on signatures and states, the MBIDS can determine if packets are malicious.
Figure 35. Z-Wave Misuse-Based Intrusion Detection System
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With this binary evaluation, 1 for misuse case and 0 for valid case, an investigator or
system administrator can determine malicious packets and the intent of an attacker
by evaluating logged frames.
Furthermore, the MBIDS can be modified to detect packet injection attacks dis-
cussed in Section 2.5. To perform the attack illustrated in [FG13], an attacker needs
detailed knowledge of the key exchange protocol. Then, using Z-Force, the attacker
can force the target Z-Wave door lock to overwrite the current encryption key. The
attacker can now inject messages to the door lock to modify its status. However,
if the attacker does not use a valid Source ID or uses Source ID 0x01, the attack
is detected. The same applies to the Scapy-Radio tool [PLD14]. If the Source ID
violates the MBIDS group membership policy, it is classified as a misuse case and
detected.
The MBIDS provides security in the lacking ITU-T G.9959-based networks. The
lack of security and indefensibility motivates the need for a system capable of mon-
itoring network activity. As an illustration, a vignette is provided in Appendix B
discussing the use of WSNs in a deployed combat environment and the security im-
plications of its use.
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research
The next logical step for this research is to include the evaluation of remain-
ing Command Classes and their corresponding Payload parameters. However, since
Z-Wave is a proprietary protocol, proprietary information is needed toward imple-
mentation of all Command Classes.
Secondly, tuning the SDR to receive packets with varying preamble lengths can in-
crease the MBIDS detection accuracy of other types of packet injection attacks. The
EZ-Wave tool provides an attacker with more capabilities than Z-Force or Scapy-
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Radio [HRRL16]. Device fingerprinting through preamble manipulation allows an
attacker to perform network reconnaissance and enumeration. With this informa-
tion, the attacker can target specific devices on the network. However, the MBIDS
packet capture device can be tuned to accept packets with varying preamble lengths.
Specifically, [HRRL16] shows that Z-Wave devices will respond to packet with 2B
or greater preambles. If the MBIDS SDR is tuned to receive packets with preamble
lengths of at least 2B and any field in the packets used for device fingerprinting is
invalid, EZ-Wave attacks will be detected.
Another area of future research is using the MBIDS as a framework. Given the
feasibility of an MBIDS, vendors that are partnered with Sigma Designs and receive
Z-Wave SDKs have knowledge of the proprietary protocol and are free to add their
interoperable modifications. Vendors develop devices and know what CmdCls, Cmds,
and Pld (parameters) each device supports. Using the MBIDS deterministic byte
field evaluations, vendors can integrate a detection and prevention system in each
device to allow or reject frames based on the byte fields. This will not only provide a
detection mechanism, but given the ability to evaluate received packets, devices will
be able to discard misuse cases allowing for a Z-Wave network capable of detecting
and preventing attacks.
Future work should focus on evaluating the effectiveness of a hardware-based
misuse detection system. A Z-Wave device can be implemented using an SDR and
computer peripheral to mimic normal device operation. Integrating the MBIDS on
the hardware peripheral as a proof of concept further illustrates the applicability of
this approach at defending Z-Wave networks.
Finally, this research examined the Z-Wave protocol alone. The impact that the
attacks presented herein and the detection method warrants further study on other
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ITU-T G.9959-based protocols and the efficacy of this approach can be extended to
other WSN protocols.
6.5 Supporting Documentation
All source code for this research is written in Python 2.7. The Hel Attack (Sec-
tion 3.3) involves triggering malware on an infected Z-Wave gateway to open a R-
SSH to any Internet Connected computer the attacker chooses. Therefore, a Python
server script and client script are needed for backdoor communication, namely Tar-
get SSH.py and Server SSH.py, respectively. Experiments 1 and 2 use MBIDS.py
and its associated custom imported files. Experiment 3 uses Enhanced MBIDS.py
and Z-Way-Server Comparator.py and their associated custom imported files.
All source files can be retrieved from https://github.com/AFITWiSec/ZIDS.
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Appendix A. Z-Wave Command Classes
This comprehensive list of known Command Classes is compiled using the Open-
ZWave Library [Ope14], RaZberry Pi Z-Way Developer’s Documentation [RaZ15],
and SmartThings API [Sma15] (account required). A * denotes a Command Class
that is implemented in the MBIDS.
Table 10. Z-Wave Command Classes
Name Hex Commands
NoOperation* 0x00 N/A
CallNIF* 0x01 Get (0x02)
Basic* 0x20
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
ControllerReplication 0x21
TransferGroup (0x31)
TransferGroupName (0x32)
TransferScene (0x33)
TransferSceneName (0x34)
ApplicationStatus 0x22
Busy (0x01)
RejectedRequest (0x02)
Zip 0x23 Packet (Unk)
SwitchBinary* 0x25
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SwitchMultilevel 0x26
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
StartLevelChange (0x04)
StopLevelChange (0x05)
SupportedGet (0x06)
SupportedReport (0x07)
SwitchAll 0x27
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
On (0x04)
Off (0x05)
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SwitchToggleBinary 0x28
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SwitchToggleMultilevel 0x29
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
StartLevelChange (0x04)
StopLevelChange (0x05)
SceneActivation 0x2B Set (0x01)
SceneActuatorConf* 0x2C
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SceneControllerConf 0x2D
Set (Unk)
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
SensorBinary 0x30
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SensorMultilevel 0x31
SupportedGet (0x01)
SupportedReport (0x02)
Get (0x04)
Report (0x05)
Meter 0x32
Get (0x01)
Report (0x02)
SupportedGet (0x03)
SupportedReport (0x04)
Reset (0x05)
Color 0x33
CapabilityGet (0x01)
CapabilityReport (0x02)
Get (0x03)
Report (0x04)
Set (0x05)
StartLevelCapabilityChange (0x06)
StopStateChange (0x07)
MeterPulse 0x35
Get (0x04)
Report (0x05)
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MeterTableMonitor 0x3D
GetAdminId (Unk)
GetID (Unk)
StatusDepthGet (Unk)
StatusDateGet (Unk)
CurrentDataGet (Unk)
HistoricalDataGet (Unk)
ThermostatMode 0x40
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SupportedGet (0x04)
SupportedReport (0x05)
ThermostatOperatingState 0x42
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
ThermostatSetPoint 0x43
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SupportedGet (0x04)
SupportedReport (0x05)
ThermostatFanMode 0x44
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
SupportedGet (0x04)
SupportedReport (0x05)
ThermostatFanState 0x45
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
ClimateControlSchedule 0x46
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
ChangedGet (0x04)
ChangedReport (0x05)
OverrideSet (0x06)
OverrideGet (0x07)
OverrideReport (0x08)
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DoorLockLogging 0x4C
RecordSupportedGet (0x01)
RecordSupportedReport (0x02)
RecordGet (0x03)
RecordReport (0x04)
ScheduleEntryLock 0x4E
Enable (Unk)
WeekdayGet (Unk)
WeekdatReport (Unk)
YearGet (Unk)
YearReport (Unk)
6lowpan 0x4F
FirstFragment (Unk)
SubsequentFragment (Unk)
BasicWindowCovering 0x50
StartLevelChange (0x01)
StopLevelChange (0x02)
TransportService 0x55
FirstFragment (Unk)
FragmentComplete (Unk)
FragmentRequest (Unk)
FragmentWait (Unk)
SubsequentFragment (Unk)
CRC16Encap* 0x56 Encap (0x01)
DeviceResetLocally 0x5A Notification (0x01)
CentralScene 0x5B
CapabilityGet (0x01)
CapabilityReport (0x02)
Set (0x03)
ZWavePlusInfo 0x5E
Get (0x01)
Report (0x02)
MultiChannel 0x60
CapabilityGet (Unk)
CapabilityReport (Unk)
CmdEncap (Unk)
EndPointFind (Unk)
EndPointFindReport (Unk)
EndPointGet (Unk)
EndPointReport (Unk)
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DoorLock 0x62
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
ConfigurationSet (0x04)
ConfigurationGet (0x05)
ConfigurationReport (0x06)
UserCode 0x63
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
UserNumberGet (0x04)
UserNumberReport (0x05)
Configuration* 0x70
Set (0x04)
Get (0x05)
Report (0x06)
Alarm 0x71
Get (0x04)
Report (0x05)
SupportedGet (0x07)
SupportedReport (0x08)
ManufacturerSpecific 0x72
Get (0x04)
Report (0x05)
PowerLevel 0x73
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
TestNodeSet (0x04)
TestNodeGet (0x05)
TestNodeReport (0x06)
Protection* 0x75
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Lock 0x76
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
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NodeNaming 0x77
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
LocationSet (0x04)
LocationGet (0x05)
LocationReport (0x06)
FirmwareUpdateMd 0x7A
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
MdGet (Unk)
MdReport (Unk)
RequestGet (Unk)
RequestReport (Unk)
StatusReport (Unk)
GroupNaming 0x7B
Set (Unk)
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
RemoteAssociationActivate 0x7C Activate (Unk)
RemoteAssociation 0x7D
Set (Unk)
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
Battery 0x80
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Clock 0x81
Set (0x04)
Get (0x05)
Report (0x06)
Hail 0x82 Hail (0x01)
WakeUp 0x84
IntervalSet (0x04)
IntervalGet (0x05)
IntervalReport (0x06)
Notification (0x07)
NoMoreInformation (0x08)
CapabilitiesGet (0x09)
CapabilitiesReport (0x0A)
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Association* 0x85
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Remove (0x04)
GroupingGet (0x05)
GroupingsReport (0x06)
Version* 0x86
Get (0x11)
Report (0x12)
CommandClassGet (0x13)
CommandClassReport (0x14)
Indicator 0x87
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Propietary 0x88
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Language 0x89
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Time 0x8A
DateGet (Unk)
DateReport (Unk)
TimeGet (Unk)
TimeReport (Unk)
TimeOffsetGet (Unk)
TimeOffsetReport (Unk)
TimeOffsetSet (Unk)
TimeParameters 0x8B
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
GeographicLocation 0x8C
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
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MultiChannelAssociation 0x8E
Set (0x01)
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
Remove (0x04)
GroupingGet (0x05)
GroupingsReport (0x06)
MultiCmd 0x8F Encap (Unk)
EnergyProduction 0x90
Get (0x02)
Report (0x03)
ManufacturerProprietary 0x91
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
ScreenMd 0x92
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
ScreenAttibutes 0x93
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
SimpleAvControl 0x94
Set (Unk)
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
SupportedGet (Unk)
SupportedReport (Unk)
Security* 0x98
SupportedGet (0x02)
SupportedReport (0x03)
SchemeGet (0x04)
SchemeReport (0x05)
NetworkKeySet (0x06)
NetworkKeyVerify (0x07)
SchemeInherit (0x08)
NonceGet (0x40)
NonceReport (0x80)
MessageEncap (0x81)
MessageEncapNonceGet (0xc1)
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IpConfiguration 0x9A
Set (Unk)
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
Release (Unk)
Renew (Unk)
AssociationCommand-
Configuration
0x9B
SupportedRecordsGet (0x01)
SupportedRecordsReport (0x02)
Set (0x03)
Get (0x04)
Report (0x05)
SensorAlarm 0x9C
Get (0x01)
Report (0x02)
SupportedGet (0x03)
SupportedReport (0x04)
SilenceAlarm 0x9D Set (Unk)
SensorConfiguration 0x9E
Set (Unk)
Get (Unk)
Report (Unk)
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Appendix B. DoD Integration of WSNs
The vignette below illustrates the use of WSN in a deployed combat environment
and the security implications inherent with its employment.
Abbreviations
AASLT - Air Assault JAF - Jalalabad Air Field
ABN - Airborne LLVI - Low Level Voice Intercept
BDA - Battle Damage Assessment NLT - No Later Than
CONOP - Concept of the Operation OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom
DIV - Division OP - Outpost
FARP - Forward Area Refueling Point RC-E - Regional Command East
FSC - Forward Support Company RIP - Relief in Place
FOB - Forward Operating Base RTB - Return to Base
GFC - Ground Force Commander SOP - Standard Operating Procedures
IBCT - Infantry Brigade Combat Team TIC - Troops in Contact
ID - Infantry Division TOC - Tactical Operations Center
ISO - In Support Of
B.1 Introduction
1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry Regiment, 1st IBCT, 101st ABN DIV (AASLT) (here-
inafter, 1-32 CAV) are deployed ISO of OEF IX. NLT 22 April 2010, 1-32 CAV
conducts a RIP with 1-112th CAV, 2nd IBCT, 4th ID of FOB Bostick, RC-E and
subordinate OPs.
FOB Bostick recently upgraded the FARP to include a Z-Wave fuel tank gauge
sensor to monitor the fuel tank levels. The fuel sensor is frequently polled by the sensor
network controller in the TOC to ensure fuel levels are known. In this way, the FSC
can track fuel usage trends and also determine when the tanks need replenishing.
FARPs are crucial in order to keep rotary wing assets near during operations.
When Blackhorse Troop, 1-32 CAV develops the CONOP for their upcoming presence
patrol, intelligence reports suggests enemy activity in the area at H-hour. Therefore,
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a request is made for AH-64D support providing overwatch and attack capabilities if
needed.
All rotary wing assists are JAF-based and must travel to their requested location.
Thankfully, FARPs allow air support longer station time by providing a refueling
point near the supported unit.
B.2 Scenario 1
While on patrol, Blackhorse Troop reports TIC. Immediately, air support is online
and ready to engage. The GFC provides authorization and the AH-64Ds begin to
neutralize the targets. After 2 hours on target, the AH-64Ds report their intent to
depart to the FARP in 10 minutes. Per SOP, Blackhorse Troop halts assaulting
through their objective until the AH-64Ds return and fire superiority is regained.
Upon return, the AH-64D eliminates all targets and Blackhorse Troop proceeds
with the BDA. Mission complete, RTB.
B.3 Scenario 2
While on patrol, Blackhorse Troop reports TIC. Immediately, air support is online
and ready to engage. The GFC provides authorization and the AH-64Ds begin to
neutralize the targets. After 2 hours on target, the AH-64Ds report their intent to
depart to the FARP in 10 minutes. Per SOP, Blackhorse Troop halts assaulting
through their objective until the AH-64Ds return and fire superiority is regained.
Unbeknownst to 1-32 CAV, at H-Hour-72, the enemy are aware that 1-32 CAV em-
ployed sensor networks in the TOC. Using wireless packet capture tools, the enemy
conducts sensor network reconnaissance, network enumeration, and device finger-
printing and identifies the fuel sensor. After some basic Google-hacking, the enemy
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determines the fuel sensor reports status updates to the controller with a fuel reading.
After capturing packets sent by the device to the controller, the enemy crafts their own
packets that reports fuel levels at 100% and persistently injects them into the network.
Even when the fuel sensor legitimately reports a low fuel level, the enemy subsequently
injects a 100% fuel level effectively nullifying the fuel sensor transmissions. As a re-
sult, the TOC believes the FARP to have sufficient fuel for upcoming operations.
Upon arrival at the FARP, refueling personnel realize fuel tanks are in fact empty
although reports in the TOC suggest they are full. As a result, the AH-64Ds cannot
refuel and the fuel that is left is not enough for the AH-64Ds to return to JAF. They
cannot re-enter the fight and cannot RTB.
Blackhorse Troops GFC radios the TOC for AH-64D status. The TOC responds,
“NoGo on air support. AH-64Ds are out of the fight. No fuel, no flying.” Realizing
that the enemy estimations suggest a 4:1 ratio in favor of the enemy, Blackhorse
Troop has no other option but to retrograde and reorganize.
B.4 Conclusion
Some DoD organizations already employ similar fuel sensors. With the current
down sizing of the force, it is necessary to optimize performance at lower costs. There-
fore, the FARP fuel sensor scenario is a reasonable one. This research provides system
integration engineers with possible attacks in WSN, countermeasures, and mitigation
strategies.
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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide low-cost, low-power, and low-complexity systems tightly
integrating control and communication. Protocols based on the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation specifying narrow-band
sub-GHz communications have significant growth potential. The Z-Wave protocol is the most common implementation.
Z-Wave developers are required to sign nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements, limiting the availability of tools to
perform open source research. This work discovers vulnerabilities allowing the injection of rogue devices or hiding
information in Z-Wave packets as a type of covert channel attack. Given existing vulnerabilities and exploitations,
defensive countermeasures are needed. A Misuse-Based Intrusion Detection System (MBIDS) is engineered, capable of
monitoring Z-Wave networks. Experiments are designed to test the detection accuracy of the system against attacks.
Results from the experiments demonstrate the MBIDS accurately detects intrusions in a Z-Wave network with a mean
misuse detection rate of 99%. Overall, this research contributes new Z-Wave exploitations and an MBIDS to detect
rogue devices and packet injection attacks, enabling a more secure Z-Wave network.
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